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ABSTRACT 
The 2007 Merida Initiative provides the framework for the cooperation between America 
and Mexico, supporting the fight against the Pack Virus in Mexico. The new American-
Mexican policy of combating the drug cartels, transnational gangs, and paramilitaries is a 
first step in creating a real U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) theater defense.   
The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy is a supporting effort to the U.S. defense 
strategy, the Mexican strategy to counter the violence, and national policies of the U.S. 
government. The USNORTHCOM-Mexico strategy emphasizes the U.S. and Mexican 
military role in collaborating to create a solid institution to be utilized in support of the 
Mexican government.  
The partnering of the two militaries creates the conditions for increasing Mexican 
capabilities in eight functional areas.  An emphasis on intelligence surveillance, 
reconnaissance (ISR), Mexican Special Forces, and consequence management operations 
are factors that would contribute to the transformation of the Mexican military into a 
counter insurgency force.  
A list of recommendations for policy makers and military leaders is provided to 
strengthen the gains created by the Merida Initiative. The increase in capabilities and 
credibility of the Mexican military benefits both the economic and security policies of 
Mexico and the U.S. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Non-state actors or more specifically, the Pack Virus1 are causing violence and a 
disruption to security and services within the U.S. due to the fourth generation warfare 
(4GW) occurring in Mexico.  The U.S. does not have a future strategy to deal with the 
non-state entities engaged in fourth generation warfare within Mexico.  Any U.S. strategy 
involving Mexico must take into account the cultural sensitivities of the Mexican people, 
government, and military.  Specifically, the Department of Defense (DoD) through the 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) must provide a strategy to support 
the Mexican military in dealing with this emerging threat to U.S. security.  
Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is not a fight for control of the government or 
political boundaries, but for control of areas, terrain, and trade routes within Mexico, 
where laws will not be enforced.  Max Manwaring describes 4GW as:  
Fourth generation warfare is a gray area phenomenon where war, crime, 
and peace blur manifesting themselves as threats to the stability of nation 
states by non-state actors (gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, 
pirates, criminal enterprises) and non-governmental processes and 
organizations. (2003)  
The numerous drug cartels/drug trade organizations (DTOs), third generation 
gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13), and the Zetas are all non-state organizations 
that are causing violence and instability though out Mexico and within areas of the U.S., 
specifically along the U.S./Mexico border and major metropolitan areas to include: 
Phoenix, Arizona; Atlanta, Georgia; and Northern Virginia (Caldwell, 2009). These non-
state groups are a hybrid threat earning the term Pack Virus for its similarity to a pack of  
 
 
                                                 
1 Pack Virus is my non-doctrinal term for non-state entities engaged in fourth generation warfare in 
Mexico due the similarities between the actions of a virus or a pack of wolves as they feed on a part of the 
system in order to survive. 
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wolves and a virus.  Hybrid threats from non-state entities or groups that are interacting 
in the “grey area” between military and criminal acts and using 4GW tactics to achieve 
goals will be referred to as Pack Virus for this thesis.   
The 4GW fight is not only about non-state actors of drug cartels/drug trade 
organizations (DTOs), transnational gangs, and international thugs for hire; it is rooted in 
the government of Mexico (GOM) corruption of police, prisons, local officials, and the 
justice system.  The Pack Virus continues to exploit and increase the corruption in 
Mexico in order to gain and maintain core areas of operations.  According to Ralph 
Reyes, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) chief for Mexico and Central America, 
the Zetas are “responsible for the majority of the homicides, the narcotic-related 
homicides, the beheadings, the kidnappings, the extortions that take place in Mexico” 
(Ware, 2009).  These groups are fighting fourth generation warfare against the 
governments of Mexico and America in order to expand the control of illegal trafficking 
operations including: smuggling of drugs, weapons, money and people.  These violent 
non-state groups are fighting among themselves and against the Mexican government for 
control of illegal trafficking routes along the Mexican and U.S. border.  At times, forming 
partnerships with a common goal to disrupt law enforcement activities, these groups have 
the capability to overwhelm local law enforcement.  Ciudad Juarez offers a horrific 
example of local police being corrupted and murdered by the Pack Virus in Mexico 
(Padgett, 2009).  To limit the operational capacity of these organizations to conduct 
illegal trafficking operations and the flow of money, drugs, people, and weapons across 
the international border, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will have to 
confront these non-state entities within America, through the U.S. Border Patrol, local 
law enforcement, and with the support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  In 
addition to DHS, DoD through USNORTHCOM, must provide a strategy to deal with the 
violence in Mexico. 
DoD can offer unique capabilities to enhance law enforcement and homeland 
security in the fight against the Pack Virus.  Besides increased intelligence gathering, 
unique equipment and robust training of law enforcement and military in Mexico and the 
U.S., DoD can help support the 2007 Merida Initiative.  Utilizing the developing 
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partnerships with the Mexican military can create opportunities for DoD to provide 
additional support to the 2007 Merida Initiative (Renuart, 2010). If the Pack Virus can be 
destroyed and disrupted in Mexico, this will weaken related groups within America.  
Utilizing DoD to strengthen Mexico’s military in the 4GW fight is within the National 
Defense Strategy and the 2007 Merida Initiative.  The National Defense Strategy of 
America is about defending America against threats before they occur in the United 
States by having an “active layered defense” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008).  DoD 
is part of the solution to stopping the operational capabilities of the Pack Virus in Mexico 
and in America.     
B. BACKGROUND 
Prior to 9/11 there was neither the U.S. political will nor interest from the 
Mexican government to cooperate with America’s war on drugs nor focus on North 
American Security (Renuart, 2010).  After 9/11, America began to increase the awareness 
for support and stability in Mexico, but few resources were dedicated to supporting 
Mexico.  With the concerns over illegal immigrants and the porous southern border, 
America’s post-9/11 strategic plans included strengthening Mexico’s ability to stop the 
Pack Virus’s free reign of power over select regions within Mexico.  Through corruption, 
intimidation, and violence the Pack Virus has become embedded into towns and cities, as 
is the case in Juarez, Mexico. The resources dedicated to supporting the Mexican 
government efforts to defeat the Pack Virus that controlled the southern avenues of 
approaches into America, would not be increased until late 2007.  Prior to the 2007 
Merida Initiative, the U.S. military provided almost no assistance to the Mexico military.  
On average the U.S. military budget for travel, officer exchanges, and training with 
Mexico averaged about three million U.S. dollars (USD) per year (Milardo, 2009).  2 
The 2007 Merida Initiative, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, 
provided a framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the 
fight against the drug cartels, gangs, and paramilitary units (Pack Virus) operating in 
                                                 
2 Mark Milardo is the senior USNORTHCOM planner for Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) for 
Mexico.  During planning meetings in June 2009 for possible deployment to Mexico he provided insight 
into Mexico.  This information is from the planning and working papers from the meeting. (Milardo, 2009) 
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Mexico (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). The 2007 Merida Initiative was intended to 
increase law enforcement, intelligence, and training between the government of Mexico 
(GOM) and the U.S.  In addition, new equipment and aircraft for the Mexican military 
would be used to fight drug trafficking organizations and “other transnational organized 
crime” (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2008). Although this provides for immediate needs, there 
is a lack of future strategic guidance from the Department of State (DOS), Department of 
Homeland Security, and Department of Defense in regard to the state of Mexico.   
A search of the classified and unclassified archives at USNORTHCOM in March 
and April 2009 did not produce anything more than informational papers, press releases, 
and out-of-date plans from Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in regards to policies for 
dealing with Mexico.3  In the case of Mexico, only the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) papers were used as reference.  The DOS issues guidance for DoD 
in regards to dealing with the military.  For example, the DOS guidance is used in 
development of the theater engagement plan for other nations to include: Colombia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Sudan.  In these cases, DOS is the lead federal agency in providing 
guidance to DoD, DHS, and other federal agencies regarding policy and interaction with 
other nation states.  Presidential directives and executive orders along with the DOS 
guidance enables DoD to prepare a strategy for dealing with other nations states.  Yet, in 
the case of Mexico, the 2007 Merida Initiative is used as the foundation for providing 
guidance to DoD.  The DOS has failed to provide guidance and define metrics of 
performance or clear strategic goals as it pertains to Merida (Government Accounting 
Office [GAO], 2010). 
As of 1 July 2010, Mexico has not declared a “state of emergency,” though it has 
deployed the military to fight the Pack Virus.  By formally declaring a state of 
emergency, Mexico would create legal conditions for marital law and have legal 
ramifications that are outside the framework of this research.  The GOM continues to use 
the military as police as it battles non-state entities within its borders.  In June 2009, the 
Los Angeles Times reported over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police were deployed 
                                                 
3 Mexico was previously in SOUTHCOM area of responsibility until the creation of USNORTHCOM 
in 2002. 
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in the “war against traffickers.”  In addition, “7,000 people have been killed in drug-
related violence in the last 15 months, according to government and media estimates” 
(Ellingwood, 2009).  Yet, by November 2009, news sources were increasing the 
estimates to 16,000 to 18,000 killed due to the drug violence within the last three years 
with over 6,290 killed in 2008 (Assosiated Press, 2010; Booth, 2009).  In Juarez, the 
sister city of El Paso, Texas, there were approx seven killings a day or 2000 deaths since 
the start of the 2009 year (MSNBC, 2009; Stevenson, 2009).  Juarez is about the size of 
Dallas, Texas with a population estimate between one and 1.5 million (Olsen, 2009).  
There are reports of estimates of up to a third of the residents have fled the violence 
(Kearney, 2009).  Using the high end of population, 1.5 million, this is murder rate of 133 
per 100,000 inhabitants.  The murder rate for Dallas (1.3 million) is 13/ 100000 and for 
El Paso, one of the safest cities in America, had only 17 murders in all of 2008 or a 
2/100000 rate (Olsen, 2009). Compared to living in the sister city of El Paso, it is 67 
times more likely for a resident to be killed in Juarez (Olsen, 2009). 
The emergence of the drug cartels with criminal elements of international gangs 
(MS-13) and hired thugs (los Zetas) has created a synergetic network of money, violence, 
and international reach that effects not only Mexico but also other areas of Central 
America and North America.  To combat the increase in violence in Central America, the 
2007 Merida Initiative included funding for other countries besides Mexico (Roberts & 
Walser, 2007).  As of 2009, the Zetas are considered to be their own DTO by U.S. law 
enforcement; DTOs regularly contracted enforcement, transportation, and security 
operations out to other organizations and the Zetas were regularly hired by the Gulf 
Cartel for security and assassination operations. (Vulliamy, 2009).  The Zetas, defectors 
from the Mexican military, were at one time hired mercenaries that were employed by the 
Gulf Cartel as an “armed wing” of the organization.  In addition to paramilitary groups, 
gangs with local knowledge are hired by the Pack Virus to protect and transport illegal 
items across the international border.  As the Zetas demonstrate, in the 4GW the Pack 
Virus has adapted and become more than just hired thugs.  These groups partake in 
criminal activity of all kinds in order to increase their power and influence.  In 2006, Mili  
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noted that “Traditional criminal activities like drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, and 
smuggling are rapidly becoming the main source of revenues for both terrorist groups and 
gangs” (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007). 
The war in Mexico has created “spill over” into America according to most media 
reports.  Since the 2007 Merida Initiative, interference of standard operations within the 
United States has occurred.  More resources have been sent in the form of DHS 
personnel, equipment, and money to increase security along the southern border because 
of fears of “spillover” (MSNBC, 2009).  Yet, there is a debate whether or not “spillover” 
violence can be quantified and what defines “spillover” (Longmire, 2009; Sarukhan, 
2010).  The spillover from the Mexican drug war cannot be identified due to reporting 
factors and definition of spillover. 
Crime statistics are not categorized by drug offense, but by different metrics.  In 
the case of FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) statistics, these are a combination of 
reported crimes by over 17000 police agencies (FBI, 2010). The FBI Web site discusses 
the problems with databases, collection, and provides a workbook to offer definitions and 
help with providing the correct data to the FBI.  However, these are “reported crimes,” 
and most of the crimes committed by non-state entities in America, are intimidation, 
corruption, extortion, and kidnapping of illegal aliens or rivals. As Dr. Bruneau states, 
“One can begin to see how third generation gangs, drug cartels, and terrorist groups begin 
to blend together leveraging their skills and connections in trafficking people, weapons, 
and drugs across borders, particularly those of the United States” (Bruneau, 2005).  These 
types of crimes are under reported or not reported at all in the UCR (Longmire, 2009).  In 
addition, the murder of U.S. government employees in Mexico would not make it into the 
UCR.  The murder of Lesley Enriquez and her husband did not happen in America, so 
this incident would not be part of the FBI statistics, but it does fit the definition of spill 
over violence (CNN, 2010).  Additional research on kidnappings and murder statistics, 
which are reported in the U.S., could offer additional information on what crimes are 
being committed in the U.S. by the Pack Virus.   
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1. Costs of the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels 
Mexico is the third largest trading partner for the United States with 
approximately $385 billion trade last year (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009).  According to 
the DOS Web site, bilateral trade reached over one billion dollars a day with Mexico 
(Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009). Comparatively, all 27 countries of the European Union 
combined in a year would only equal a month of U.S. trade with Mexico (Mexico, U.S. 
Embassy, 2009).  A more secure and less corrupt Mexico would conceivably increase 
tourism, trade, and travel between the two countries.  In Juarez, Mexico, the business 
community has already begun to ask for more help from both the U.S. and Mexican 
governments.  In fact, it has asked for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping troops to help 
stop the violence (Stevenson, 2009).  The proximity to the U.S. border creates an 
international business area where 18 percent of all trade between Mexico and U.S. takes 
place (Chamberlin, 2007).  In addition to legal commerce, the lucrative illegal smuggling 
trafficking routes cause Juarez to be a contested area between the GOM and the non-state 
entities fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes.  Gun battles between law 
enforcement and DTOs and non-state entities have caused thousands of deaths.  The gun 
battles are only part of the violence that has become part of the daily life.  Kidnappings, 
extortion, intimidation, and assignations are common occurrences within Juarez.  The 
drug violence is bad for business. The statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau depict a 
downward trend in the amount of revenue for Mexico from 2007 till February 2010 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010). 
A vast amount of human capital is being expended to fight these organizations.  
Human resources of 45,000 Mexican troops, DHS force increases along the southern 
border, and Joint Task Force-North for DoD are all focused on supporting law 
enforcement to fight these non-state enities (Ellingwood, 2009; MSNBC, 2009).  These 
resources target the illegal trafficing operations, including: drugs, weapons, money, and 
people exiting and entering the United States. 
Loss of control within regions of Mexico has already occured.  Retired U.S. Army 
General, McCaffrey and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
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Admiral Hayden commented to USA Today that Mexico “…ranked with Iran as a top 
security risk to the United States” (Hawley, 2009).  The dislocation of Mexicans from 
areas has not occurred yet, but the concern is that the U.S. would have to deal with 
thousands of displaced persons if the violence escalated out of control. As the fourth 
generation fight  fight continues, areas of Mexico are not being controlled by any level of 
Mexican government.  Yet, the Pack Virus does not control areas with a shadow 
governement or pose a political challenge to the Mexcian government.  Instead, areas 
within Mexcio are controlled by the Pack Virus through fear and intimidation after one 
group establishs domination of the area over rival non-state entities (Vulliamy, 2009).  It 
is in the absence of effective GOM control that the Pack Virus operates unmolested and 
fights for control of regions from other Pack Virus groups.   
The spread and growth of the 4GW phenonmenon into America could cause areas 
to be ungoverned and corrputed by the influence of drug profits and violence.  In June 
2010, reports of areas along the U.S. border were considered to be off limits to U.S. 
persons as it was deemed to dangerous to enter due to the threat from the Pack Virus 
(Miller, 2010). Currently, the violence has spread beyond the southern border states.  
Police in Atlanta and Phoenix, both major drug transit points, have attributed a wave of 
kidnappings on the spreading turf war among the cartels.  Drug-related violence has 
become ever more brazen and frequent, including a rise in attacks on Border Patrol 
agents (Hawley, 2009).  In addition, the cartels are targeting people within America.  Los 
Zetas has sent young boys (13 years old) to assisinate rivals in the United States (Ware, 
2009). 
The violence of Mexico’s fourth generation warfare fight is resulting in 
kidnappings, death, and violence in cities within America, where the Pack Virus has 
already infiltrated into and is conducting operations.  Alicia Caldwell writes in the 
Huffington Post, “U.S. authorities are reporting a spike in killings, kidnappings and home 
invasions connected to Mexico’s murderous cartels. And to some policymakers' surprise, 
much of the violence is happening not in towns along the border, where it was assumed 
the bloodshed would spread, but a considerable distance away, in places such as Phoenix 
and Atlanta” (2009).  Unlike terrorist organizations, which are motivated and at times 
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constrained by political or ideological objectives, these non-state entities have no 
limitations about utilizing violence to achieve goals in Mexico.  Yet, within America, the 
DTO’s use a “bad for business” philosophy, which seems to constrain the violence 
(Sanchez, March 2010).4  Lawmakers and policy advisors must correctly define this 
emerging threat, which these non-state organizations are to the security within the United 
States.  These non-state organizations are more than just organized crime or criminal 
gangs, yet not defined as international terrorist organizations.  Labeled as narco terrorist 
groups, Pack Virus, or transnational drug gangs these groups are clearly blurring the lines 
between criminal action and combat operations.    
In the Armed Forces Journal, Hoffman defines a hybrid threat as “Any adversary 
that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, 
irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their 
political objectives” (Hoffman, 2009).  The non-state organization destroys part of the 
host in order to thrive and reproduce, similar to virus as it kills and spreads throughout 
the body.  In addition, these non-state entities are similar to a pack of wolves which feed 
on the weak and reproduce until killed through hunting or the environment change is too 
hostile to survive.  The Pack Virus has many common characteristics: transnational, 
networks of people, no limitations in utilizing violence to achieve goals, and a threat to 
U.S. security.    
2. Conclusion 
Studying this 4GW battle and assisting Mexico in its fight will enable America to 
have a better understanding of the Pack Virus threat.  In addition, disruption and defeat of 
the Pack Virus in Mexico will provide a more secure international border between 
Mexico and the U.S.  A proactive approach to defeating non-state entities within Mexico 
would enable the entire spectrum of U.S. national power to focus on the security threat 
prior to greater escalation of violence within the U.S.  In addition, until the Pack Virus is 
                                                 
4 LtCol Sanchez is the senior JAG officer at JTF [spell out first time use]North and advises the 
commander of JTF North on legal policy and constraints.  During a USNORTHCOM planning conference 
in February 2010, LtCol Sanchez explained the legality of intelligence oversight, targeting of DTOs, and 
the modus operands of the DTOs operating in America (Sanchez, March 2010). 
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defeated within Mexico, DoD will have to refocus on the southern international border 
and increase support to the Mexican military.  Focusing on the problem in Mexico will 
mean utilizing indirect approach to support the Mexican military.  As Admiral Olson, the 
commanding officer of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) states, “The indirect 
approach includes enabling partners to combat violent extremist organizations by 
contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of technology, and 
operational support” (Olson, 2009).  Yet, “military power cannot, by itself, restore or 
guarantee stable peace” (U.S. Army, 2008).  A whole-of-government approach and 
strategy is needed to defeat the Pack Virus. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
• How can the U.S. influence the warfare in Mexico so the Mexican 
government can prevail?   
• What role can DoD play to help the Mexican military win this fight? 
2. Secondary Questions   
• Will examining Plan Colombia as a case study lead to insight to help deal 
with the Pack Virus in Mexico? 
• How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and the 2007 
Merida Initiative for the military?  
• Did the level of security within the state [of? Columbia? 
State.]increase or decrease after the U.S. involvement? 
• How long did the increase in violence last? 
• Did the non-state entities increase or decrease operational 
capacity? 
• Does the DoD strategy support the Mexican strategy of countering fourth 
generation warfare? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
This thesis will create awareness and a better understanding of the emerging 
threat of non-state entities, specifically the Pack Virus, in the security of the U.S. From 
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this awareness, USNORTHCOM can develop a U.S. military strategy to support the 2007 
Merida Initiative and make recommendations for future U.S. military aid to Mexico.   
In addition, the USNORTHCOM strategy can be used in future development of 
homeland security and defense operation plans.  The development of operation plans 
requires the input from interagency partners including: Department of Justice (DOJ), 
DHS, law enforcement, Department of Treasury, and Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA).  Therefore, the awareness and knowledge of the threat from the Pack 
Virus will benefit many of the partners in homeland security.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Non-state actors are influencing more regions throughout the world through 
violence and intimidation.  In Mexico, these entities are creating violence, which is 
challenging the sovereignty and security of regions throughout Mexico, but more 
importantly along the U.S./Mexico border.  As these groups interact with and against 
each other and the Mexican military, examples of fourth generation warfare (4GW) 
emerge. What is 4GW and what are the capabilities of these groups engaged in 4GW as it 
pertains to the security of the United States?  After identifying non-state actors, 4GW, 
and the problems caused by these groups, then possible solutions to these dynamic and 
growing threats will be discussed. 
A. HISTORY AND DEFINITIONS OF FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE 
War has evolved from tribes fighting each other for resources to mobile lines of 
men opposing each other funded by kings and governments.  Through technology and 
innovation, war has evolved into modern networks of people (non-state actors) exploiting 
others in order to make gains with disregard for the lives of those not within their 
networks.  This is a brief summary of the evolution of warfare from first generation to 
fourth generation warfare.   
Max Manwaring describes and defines 4GW as:  
…a gray area phenomenon where war, crime, and peace blur manifesting 
themselves as threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors 
(gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, pirates, criminal 
enterprises) and non-governmental processes and organizations. (2003)  
Though the U.S. military has not defined fourth generation warfare in any 
doctrinal publication as to date, the concept has been discussed for over 20 years (U.S. 
Army, 2008).   
Author William Lind champions the 4GW concept in his blog, On War, in 
numerous books, and articles.  Writing and blogging about his hypothesis on the 
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evolution of warfare, Lind bases his thinking on the foundation of Martin van Creveld 
and Boyd writings (2004).  Lind (2004) portrays all current fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as examples of 4GW.  According to Lind, nation states have lost the 
“monopoly on war and…many different entities, not states, are fighting war” (2004).  
Fourth generation warfare redefines the conventional definition of who the enemy is and 
what the enemy fights for.  The American Army has only categorized this type of fighting 
as “irregular warfare” in the doctrine to adapt to this emerging threat (Department of the 
Army , 2006(b)). 
Martin van Creveld (1991) has also written about 4GW and has written numerous 
books on the subject of low intensity conflict.  What is important about van Creveld’s 
work is that in 1991, it gave an alternative thinking to Clausewitz on why nations fight 
war.  Clausewitz wrote On War and explained that war is an extension of politics by 
nation states (1873).  Van Creveld hypothesizes that war is more than an extension of 
politics (1991).  Van Creveld writes that fourth generation warfare has changed the who, 
why, and how warfare is fought (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007).  Thus, in 4GW the Pack 
Virus will not fight to conquer Mexico with armies in order to impose their will on the 
people of Mexico.  Instead, it will employ corruption of politicians, threats and 
intimidation of the populace, and destruction of law enforcement to carve out 
geographical areas within Mexico to further its illegal trafficking operations.  Within the 
areas that the Pack Virus controls, the GOM is unable to establish the rule of law or 
provide security to the people of the region.  Law enforcement and the Mexican judicial 
system is ineffective at containing the Pack Virus within the areas where the Pack Virus 
has operational control.    
Thomas X. Hammes and Lind (2004) write about 4GW occurring on the modern 
battlefield.  They agree that the small non-state group can counter the nation state by 
utilizing the advantages of insurgent warfare and use of asymmetric tactics (Hammes, 
2004). Yet, Hammes concentrates more non-state entities that are fighting proxy wars for 
other states such as Hezbollah being supported by Iran.  Hammes uses the insurgencies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan as his basis of 4GW as a concept vice an evolution of warfare as 
Lind advocates.     
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Similar to the definition of terrorism, there are numerous definitions of fourth 
generation warfare.  The weakness in using 4GW model to explain the violence in 
Mexico is that, 4GW is a “concept” not a recognized generation of warfare by DoD.  At 
times, 4GW has been a model where a nation state (Iran) controls the non-state actor as in 
the 2006 Hezbollah/Israel War according to Hammes.  At other times, the Mexican drug 
war is considered fifth generation warfare, since there is not a nation state supporting the 
conflict and there are no political objectives to be gained by the Pack Virus (Moreno, 
2010).5  Even Admiral Olson, the commander of Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), in a recent speech described warfare of today without using the term fourth 
generation warfare, when he said, “Regardless of the name we use—special warfare, 
counterinsurgency warfare, irregular warfare, hybrid warfare—one thing is certain: it 
characterizes the nature of warfare we are experiencing, and will experience, for the 
foreseeable future” (2009(b)). 
B. HOW 4GW GROUPS OPERATE 
Pack Virus have many characteristics in common with terrorist organizations. 
These characteristics include: transnational, networks of people, no limitations in 
utilizing violence to achieve goals, and threats to American security.  Pack Virus groups 
operating in Mexico include: drug cartels or drug trade organizations (DTOs), “3rd 
Generation Street Gangs” (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007) and paramilitary organizations like 
the Zetas.  These groups are similar to terrorist organizations, but they do not want 
political change of the countries in which they operate, therefore these groups do not fit 
the Hoffman (2009) definition of hybrid threats.  Examples of transnational terrorist 
groups and other hybrid threats are Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, which do desire 
political change.  Nor does the Pack Virus fight as a proxy for other states such as 
Hezbollah does for Iran. 
At times, the Zetas and the DTOs control areas where the Mexican government is 
“powerless to intervene” (Brands, 2009).  This causes the disruption of security and lack 
                                                 
5 Colonel Moreno is the senior USNORTHCOM military expert on Mexico.  After the Dr Grayson 
lectures at USNORTHCOM in February 2010, he continued to talk with other attendees about Mexico 
issues and possible solutions (Moreno, 2010). 
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of control of sovereign areas within a state.  The state, therefore, loses twice in the 
inability to control regions and institute the rule of law within their boundaries.  The loss 
of security and sovereignty by the government is an example of fourth generation warfare 
concept being employed by the Zetas.  The Pack Virus employs tactics of an insurgency 
in areas to gain influence on the people.   
The Pack Virus controls areas or safe havens where the state is powerless to 
intervene.  It is in these areas where the violence is less apparent.  Where there are 
numerous incidents of violence the Pack Virus is actively fighting 4GW.  Utilizing 
intimidation, corruption, murder, and criminal acts to influence the populace and the 
GOM, the non-state entities operate in core areas without influence from the state of 
Mexico.  The present warfare in Juarez, Mexico contrasts with the “peaceful” cities of 
Ciudad Acuña and Piedras Negras controlled by the Zetas who demonstrate 4GW tactics 
(Vulliamy, 2009).  Within the cities of Acuna and Piedra Negras where one Pack Virus 
(the Zetas) has effective control of these limited geographic areas, the GOM is unable to 
provide effective security.  The Pack Virus controls the local population through 
intimidation and has effective defeated any rivals for control of the area, therefore the 
level of violence is not as high as other contested areas.  For example in Ciudad Juarez or 
Tijuana, different groups are fighting for control of the illegal trafficking corridors and 
logistical staging areas, thus the level of violence is much higher. 
C MILITARY VS. LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDING TO 4GW 
Frank G. Hoffman, who uses the term “hybrid threat” to describe the use of 
violence by non-state entities (Hoffman, 2007).  As Hoffman writes, “institutions are 
slow to adjust” and that this new form of warfare is already occurring.  In addition, he 
concludes that it is a “fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular 
warfare, and terrorism, as well as subversion” (Hoffman, 2007).  Hoffman describes 
continuum of violence from criminal acts to acts of war.  This blurring of the lines is 




violence and criminal behavior.  Figure 1 illustrates the continuum of war to criminal act 
as depicted by USNORTHCOM. As stated in the NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support Joint Operating Concept:   
In the middle is a “seam” of ambiguity where threats are neither clearly 
military wartime threats (requiring a military [DoD] response capability) 
nor clearly criminal type threats (requiring a non-military response 
capability from DHS, DOJ, or other agency). (USNORTHCOM, 2007) 
 
Figure 1.   Threats to the Homeland: Grey Area and Operational Seam of the Pack Virus 
(From U.S. Northern Command, 2007) 
It is within this continuum of violence in the area between war and criminal acts 
where the Pack Virus operates, blurring the lines between law enforcement and military 
force response.  It is in the red and grey areas that the U.S. military must use strategy to 
strengthen the Mexican military in the fight against the Pack Virus.  Within this area, the 
U.S. military will be in support of the policies set by DOS within the framework of the 
2007 Merida Initiative.  In this supported/supporting relationship between DOS and DoD,  
 
 18
the U.S. military is in a supporting role to DOS.  More importantly, through the 2007 
Merida Initiative, DoD can provide indirect support to the Mexican military in order to 
support efforts to fight the Pack Virus.    
D. USE OF 4GW TACTICS BY GANGS IN THE U.S. 
A basic understanding of what 4GW is and who fights 4GW is important to 
understanding possible solutions.  Until 2005, there was not much written about the 
subject of criminal gangs within America fighting 4GW against American society.  
Perhaps influenced by the FBI’s numerous national level operations against MS-13 
(Maras) in order to disrupt its activities, various authors began writing about MS-13 
operations in America.   
Sullivan and Wilson wrote extensively about third generation gangs and terrorism 
(2007).  Both the Zetas and MS-13 are considered to be third generation gangs according 
to Sullivan (2008).  Sullivan offers a description of the operations of third generation 
gangs and notes that all gangs are not identical in structure or organization.  For example, 
while the Zetas are a trained, paramilitary organization with a command structure, the 
Maras are a large affiliation of poor gang members throughout numerous countries.  
Sullivan states that third generation gangs, like the Zetas and Maras, “reside at the 
intersection between crime and war” (2008).  His documentation of the small non-state 
entities controlling neighborhoods, towns, and regions across Central America are 
examples of groups waging 4GW against governments which are weaker than Mexico or 
the United States.  Sullivan and Wilson base their writings on van Creveld (1991) in On 
Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism.  They describe how some gangs operate in the grey area 
between criminal activities and insurgency utilizing terrorism, drug trafficking, and 
violence to control territory (Sullivan & Wilson, 2007).    
Sullivan and Bruneau (2005) write about the emergence of criminal elements and 
non-state actors that have the potential and the capability to destroy the societies in which 
they operate.  Bruneau describes how non-state entities can “leverage skills” to conduct 
illegal trafficking operations into America from Mexico (2005). Bruneau describes the  
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current state of affairs in Mexico prior to the 2007 Merida Initiative.  His observation of 
the different groups working together in order to benefit from the illegal trafficking 
operations was ominous and valid (Kimery, 2009). 
Sullivan and Wilson (2007), in On Gangs, Crime, and Terrorism, discuss the 
interactions of third generation street gangs with the evolving 4GW model.  Throughout 
this book, the authors describe with details the events of gangs and paramilitaries of 
Central America—similar to the tactics of Mexican 4GW occurring presently.  As in 
Central America, corruption of local officials and violence resembling terrorist activities 
are tactics used by the Pack Virus in Mexico.  With gangs and Pack Virus currently 
operating in America and Mexico, there is foreshadowing of what is to come in regards to 
America’s security. 
Sullivan and Wilson (2007) expand on the ideas about “Netwar” by Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 1996).  Arquilla and Ronfeldt write asymmetric warfare 
of small groups can counter “bureaucratic-nation-state actors” by utilizing networks 
(Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 1996). This is the current state of affairs that is occurring in 
Mexico, where the government of Mexico (GOM) is slow to react and has not adapted to 
the dynamic conditions presented by the Pack Virus, which operates as a network.  The 
Pack Virus is more than a network of drug trafficking organizations; it has demonstrated 
the ability to become more efficient at killing, corrupting, intimidating, and illegal 
trafficking operations due to the deadly competition and their quest for profits.   
E. MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO THE 4GW 
As stated in the USNORTHCOM Joint concept paper, DoD will be a supporting 
element to the other tenants of national power following the DOS strategy for Mexico 
(USNORTHCOM, 2007).  There is no military only solution to defeating the Pack Virus.  
Neither set of authors, Sullivan and Bruneau nor Arquilla and Rondfeldt (1996) have 
documented possible solutions to confront the emerging threat from these organizations 
through the use of military means alone.  Arquilla and Rondfeldt offer a solution of 
countering a terrorist network by using another network to defeat it, instead of a large 
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traditional military force.  This is similar to the military saying, that the best weapon 
platform to engage and successfully defeat an enemy sniper is another sniper team. 
While Lind (2007) offers politically incorrect solutions to winning 4GW in his 
blogs, Richards (n.d.), in a paper presented to first responders, offers little insights into 
“winning” with the military.  Lind writes of military options, including total war against 
insurgents and employing flame weapons to crush the will of the people, as did Genghis 
Kahn in the thirteenth century.  Richards argues that winning fourth generation warfare is 
not the same as winning against terrorists.  He writes that winning against a 4GW 
adversary requires patience and longevity until the non-state actors are more criminal 
vice war like (Richards, n.d.).  Thus, Richards view is that once the behavior of the Pack 
Virus gravitates only into the criminal area, it becomes a law enforcement issue and there 
is no need for the military.  Lind differs on his opinions on how to win 4GW, such as by 
utilizing strong border controls and deporting illegal aliens.   
The military strategy needed to “win” against a 4GW opponent is most similar to 
a counter-insurgency operations (COIN) strategy.  Though each conflict demands a 
different strategy to defeat the specific threat there are many techniques, tactics, and 
procedures that can be used against a Pack Virus which is similar to fighting an 
insurgency (U.S. Army, 2008). As in a COIN operation, the Pack Virus must be 
separated from the local populace in order for the state to defeat it. 
The 2009 Counterinsurgency Guide offers “whole-of-government approaches” to 
develop solutions to counter insurgencies, but these can be applied to non-state actors as 
well (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010).  The guide offers specific 
guidance to separate parts of the U.S. government and how to work in collaboration to 
mitigate insurgencies.  Though designed from practical experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, these approaches are most similar to operations which could affect the 
outcome in the Mexican fight.  More importantly, it offers areas where the U.S. military 
can support other parts of DIME-FIL6 and the 2007 Merida Initiative.   
                                                 
6 Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-
FIL) are means to achieve national objectives.  Each are the individual segments of national strategy when 
combined together create synergy to provide for a plan to achieve national objectives.    
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1. The 2007 Merida Initiative  
The 2007 Merida Initiative, signed by Presidents Bush and Calderon, provided a 
framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the fight against 
the drug cartels in Mexico (Selee, 2008).  The 2007 Merida Initiative was intended to 
increase law enforcement, intelligence, and training between Mexico and America 
(Sarukhan, 2008).  In addition, new equipment and aircraft for the Mexican military 
would be purchased to fight drug trafficking organizations and “other transnational 
organized crime” (U.S. Embassy Mexico, 2010). 
Prior to 9/11, there was neither the U.S. political will nor interest from the 
Mexican government to cooperate with America’s war on drugs nor focus on North 
American security (Renuart, 2010). After 9/11, America began to increase the awareness 
for support and stability in Mexico, but few resources were dedicated to supporting 
Mexico specifically.  With the concerns over illegal immigrants and the porous southern 
border, America’s new strategic plans included strengthening Mexico’s ability to stop the 
drug cartels’ free reign of power over select regions within Mexico.  The resources 
dedicated to supporting the Mexican government efforts to defeat the drug cartels as the 
cartels that controlled the southern avenues of approaches into America would not be 
increased until 2008 (Selee, 2008).  
The main focus of funding for the Merida Initiative are the DOS programs created 
to strengthen the Mexican criminal justice system.  This includes training of the 
Secretariat of Public Security or Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP), which contains 
numerous federal police agencies.  The majority of funding from the Merida Initiative 
(1.1 of 1.4 billion dollars) is designated to support the police, prisons, and justice system 
within Mexico (U.S. Embassy Mexico, 2010). 
2. Plan Colombia  
Plan Colombia is the generic term for the U.S. funding given to the Colombian 
government in support of counter drug and counter insurgency operations in Colombia.  
The “plan” was originally an idea of President Andres Pastrana in 1998.  He envisioned 
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funding in support of economic development and humanitarian aid that would set 
conditions to help Colombia end the insurgency.  This idea morphed into the 
controversial Plan Colombia that has been funded through legislation from U.S. Congress 
from 1996 to 2006.  Plan Colombia developed by DoD increased the militarization of the 
Colombia through providing 500 U.S. military personnel to train the Colombian military 
and purchasing helicopters and equipment for the Colombians (Bailey, 2009). 
Plan Colombia contained provisions to fund the military and law enforcement 
forces to fight the drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
(Bailey, 2009).  Controversial parts of the plan are that limited funding was dedicated to 
the economic development of the Colombian government and the spraying of coca fields 
(Ungerman, 2003). The eradication of coca fields through chemicals has been the most 
recognizable rallying cry of critics of Plan Colombia.  Plan Colombia funded by the U.S. 
Congress morphed into something different from what was envisioned by the 
Colombians or the U.S. Congress.  By 2003, the limited use of equipment for counter 
drug operations had been ignored in order to fight the FARC.  In addition, the budget 
from 2000–2008 reflected over 1.3 billion USD going to five programs in addition to the 
Colombian military (Wienberg, 2007).  Alternative development, internally displaced 
persons, demobilization and reintegration, democracy and human rights, and promote the 
rule of law are five U.S. Department of State initiatives which have contributed to the 
expenditures of Plan Colombia (U.S. Department of State, 2000).   
In A Slow Road to Victory: Counterinsurgency and Strategic Innovation in 
Colombia, Ortiz and Iriarte (2006) discuss the time and strategy needed to dismantle the 
cultivation of coca and production of cocaine. They write about how Plan Colombia 
provided the long-term conditions needed for stabilization and defeat of the FARC.  The 
critical lesson learned is that counterinsurgency warfare takes time and resources to 
defeat the insurgent.  In 2008, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) provided 
testimony to Congress about the limited success of Plan Colombia, which included:  “(1) 
reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in six years and 
(2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed 
groups” (GAO, 2008).    
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3. Relevance 
The 2007 Merida Initiative is most similar to Plan Colombia in the number of 
programs funded to fight non-state entities.  In addition, the DTOs and non-state entities 
operating in Colombia are similar to those operating in Mexico in that they utilize 
violence to influence the population and to increase the share of illegal trafficking 
operations.  Studying Plan Colombia can offer best practice solutions to the problems 
presented by the non-state entities operating in Mexico.  More importantly, Plan 
Colombia created the expectation that the similar missions would take considerable time 
and resources to implement.  This leads to the assumption that the 2007 Merida Initiative 
will take years to show success, similar to Plan Colombia (GAO, 2000). 
Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative are similar in that critics claim 
these plans militarize Mexico.  Each plan has similar counter narcotic goals of supporting 
the central governments fight against the drug trade organizations  and reduce the 
violence in these countries.  A major difference in the two programs is which federal 
agency developed the two plans.  Plan Colombia, though led by DOS, was developed by 
DoD as an eradication plan with a heavy emphasis on military defeat of the FARC 
insurgency.  DOS developed the 2007 Merida Initiative, where DOJ and supporting the 
Mexican police (SSP) is the focus of funding (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009; Moreno, 
2010). 
According to Bailey, “Colombia is a case of a complicated internal war in which 
drug production and trafficking play a significant role; Mexico is a case of hyper-violent 
criminal organizations that use terrorist-like methods to challenge the government and 
society” (2009).  Bailey compares both the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia in terms 
of lessons learned for the U.S. and advocated that the Merida Initiative benefits from the 
lessons of Plan Colombia.  In addition, Bailey recognizes that “the Barak Obama 
administration has yet to define its policies toward the region” (2009).  Bailey creates a 
simple comparison of the two policies with a comparison chart which is in Table 2. 
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Table 1.   Bailey’s Contexts and Characteristics of Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative (After Bailey, 2009)  
 Plan Colombia Merida Initiative 
Country  
context 
Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. sq. 
km.; GDP=US$250B* (2008); 
GDP/cap=US$5,174; budget 
expend=US$65B; unitary, with 
significant decentralization; 32 
departments, 1,100 counties 
Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.; 
GDP=US$1,142B (2008); 
GDP/cap=US$10,747; budget 
expend=US$227B; federal, with 32 
states, 1,400 counties 
Problem profile Major guerrilla insurgencies; 
generalized violence; major 
producer & trafficker of illicit 
drugs; limited central 
government presence; 
corruption in police-justice 
system 
Minor regional rebellion; producer & 
major trafficker of illicit drugs; rapid 
upsurge in trafficking violence; 
localized challenges to government 
presence; acute corruption in police-
justice system 
Policy origins 1999-2000; U.S. proactive in 
policy design 
2007-2008; U.S. reactive in policy 
design 
Policy scope: goals 
& countries 
Internal security & anti-
trafficking; social justice; 
development. Primary= 
Colombia; secondary=Peru & 
Ecuador 
Internal security; law enforcement & 
justice admin.; Primary=Mexico; 
secondary=Central America & 
Caribbean 
Policy targets Insurgency (FARC; ELN); self-
defense organizations; drug crop 
eradication; criminal justice 
system; economic development 
(e.g., crop substitution) 
Counter-drug; counter-terror; border 
security; public security & law 
enforcement; institution-building & rule 
of law 
Time commitment 2000-2006; succeeded by 
similar follow-on policies 
Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 
2010, with indications of extension 
U.S. financial 
commitment 
US$4.5B; U.S. currently seeks 
reduced commitment 
US$1.5 B announced; approx. 10% 
program costs; --- appropriated in 2008; 
negotiations expected in Congress in 
2009. 
U.S. commitments 
for internal policy 
Reduce drug demand “Genuine partnership”; Reduce drug 
demand; halt: weapons trafficking, 
precursor chemicals, money laundering 
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F. CURRENT THREAT TO US 
There are fundamental truths throughout the evolution of warfare as supported by 
the writings of Clausewitz (1873), Sun Zsu (2009), and Lind (2004). The principles of 
war mass, security, surprise, and simplicity remain consistent throughout the ages, types, 
or evolutions in technology.  Most theorists agree that preparing for battle in the future is 
not as predictable as preparing for the last war.  Historically, the United States prepares 
well for the last war; however, the United States should prepare for warfare based on 
future threats.   
The future threat for America is currently being fought using 4GW in Mexico.  
The U.S. needs a military strategy to address this threat in Mexico, which is in line with 
the National Defense Strategy and the 2007 Merida Initiative.  The Mexican fight is not 
only with non-state actors of drug cartels/drug trade organizations, transnational gangs, 
and international thugs for hire, but rooted in Mexico’s own corruption.  The Pack Virus 
continues to exploit and increase the corruption in Mexico in order to gain and maintain 
core areas of operations.   
The violence in Mexico is impacting security in America.  The “hornet’s nest” 
disturbed by the government of Mexico (GOM), through President Calderon confronting 
the drug cartels has caused numerous deaths in Mexico and increased violence in 
America (Padgett, 2009).  “Spillover” of violence from the Mexican government 
intervention into illegal trafficking operations is occurring.  The Pack Virus is amplifying 
violence in Mexico in order to increase its share in illegal trafficking operations to 
include: drugs, weapons, money, and people.  The violence caused by the Pack Virus in 
Mexico is not just contained within Mexico.  These groups conduct operations in 
America that effect the security of America and cause violence in America.   
G. EVIDENCE 
News reports, reported kidnappings, and murders in the southern U.S. states are 
due to the cartels fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes (Ware, 2009; Caldwell, 
2009).  However, there is limited statistical data on “spillover” due the metrics used to 
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report crimes in the U.S.  Yet, the FBI has documented that there are over 200 cells of 
MS-13 operating in America (FBI, 2010). DTOs have infiltrated into every major city in 
America (Hawley, 2009).  These groups are already established within America and only 
need to be employed by other nations to create the most dangerous course of action for 
American security.  There is nothing culturally from preventing terrorist groups and the 
Pack Virus from working together (Bruneau, 2005). Bruneau is one of a few,  along with 
Kimery (2010) and the editors of Nightwatch, who are the dissenting opinions as most 
literature argues that terrorist groups conduct criminal activity, but very few criminal 
groups conduct terrorist activities.  In 2009, Kimery writes about the “marriage of 
convenience” between terrorist groups and the Pack Virus (Kimery, 2009).  In addition, 
as recently as July 2010, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) intelligence reports and 
OpenSource.gov detailed an article from Kuwait that described the arrest of a Hezbollah 
terrorist in Tijuana who was working to set up operational cells (NightWatch, 2010; Open 
Source, 2010).  
The non-state entities may engage in 4GW in America in order to defeat other 
Pack Virus organizations and to increase profits.  According to numerous news reports, 
criminal activity is already occurring with kidnappings and abductions.  Allowing the 
Pack Virus to remain in control of the illegal trafficking operations permits an avenue for 
terrorist organizations to exploit. 
Illegal trafficking operations from Mexico to America are controlled by non-state 
entities (i.e., Pack Virus), which are engaged in 4GW against the government of Mexico 
(GOM).  The emerging threat of the Pack Virus with known terrorist groups creates the 
conditions for terrorists to easily infiltrate into America. Though the ties between the 
organizations are “marriages of convenience” at this time, the emergence of non-state 
groups operating in collaboration with terrorists who are sponsored by nation states offers 
a great threat to American security (Kimery, 2009).  Fourth generation warfare in 
America is a battle that DoD is not prepared to fight. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
There is a significant body of literature regarding strategy to win war and the 
4GW model.  What is well understood is that non-state actors are defeating and 
marginalizing militaries in many places throughout the world.  In addition, techniques 
and tactics to fight these elements have been discussed and documented during COIN 
operations.  However, there is limited research documenting the defeat of a non-state 
actor by military means alone.  Utilizing COIN tactics and procedures to defeat 
insurgencies, the military is only successful in about seven percent of the time (Jones, 
2010). Yet, a military strategy is needed to help defeat and marginalize the Pack Virus 
operating and conducting fourth generation warfare in Mexico. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for studying the U.S. policy in support of the GOM strategy for 
degrading the capabilities of the Pack Virus will utilize a comparison case study of Plan 
Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative. Two primary questions will be answered 
utilizing the current and historical data from each case study, to determine if the 
American intervention enabled the state to prevail over the non-state entities.   
1. How can America influence the warfare in Mexico so the Mexican 
government can prevail? 
2. What role can DoD play to help the Mexican military win this fight? 
The non-state entities in Mexico fighting fourth generation warfare (4GW) have 
similarities to the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia.  Both 
groups are heavily involved in illegal trafficking operations, carve out regional areas 
where the national government is powerless to intervene, and cause violence among the 
population.  Studying Plan Colombia and the 2007 Merida Initiative can offer possible 
solutions to the problems presented by the non-state entities fighting fourth generation 
warfare (4GW) in Mexico.  Analyzing what policies are being applied in the 2007 Merida 
Initiative can create recommendations for the fight against the Pack Virus operating in 
Mexico.  The comparative analysis of the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia will 
include six metrics: 
1. How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and 2007 Merida 
Initiative? 
2. What areas were funded in Plan Colombia compared to 2007 Merida 
Initiative? 
3. Did the level of security within the state increase or decrease after the U.S. 
involvement? 
4. How long did the violence last? 
5. Did the non-state entities increase or decrease operational capacity? 
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6. Lead federal agency in developing the plan for Plan Colombia and 2007 
Merida Initiative. 
In addition, the comparison between DoD support to the military for each plan 
will be compared. 
1. Number of U.S. military advisors in Mexico?  In Colombia? 
2. Amount of U.S. equipment to Mexico? To Colombia? 
Through these metrics the causality of increased money and military equipment to 
decrease violence caused by the non-state entities within the supported state will be 
tested.   
The weakness of this comparison case study is that the quantitative data for the 
2007 Merida Initiative is not complete.  The two situations are different for Colombia and 
Mexico, in that Colombia fought an insurgency against both terrorists groups and non-
state entities, involved in the drug trade, is different than the transnational drug cartel 
problems in Mexico.  In addition, the results of Plan Colombia could be argued to be 
atypical and the conclusions drawn from the initial data from the 2007 Merida Initiative 
are not solidified as historical record.  Yet, the strength of this comparison case study is 
that the current policy can be modified in order to increase the likelihood of successful 
support to Mexico.  
A. USNORTHCOM STRATEGY 
From these metrics, a future DoD strategy can be developed by USNORTHCOM.  
The USNORTHCOM strategy must involve the restraints and constraints of funding, 
political acceptability, and the legal authority of the 2007 Merida Initiative.  The 
USNORTHCOM strategy should be applied to eight functional areas identified through 
the 2007 Merida Initiative and the best practices from Plan Colombia.  The eight 
functional areas include: air and maritime surveillance; intelligence collection; command 
and control network hardware and software; improve interdiction capabilities; 
consequence management; special operations; institutional development; and military to 
military exchanges.  The proposed USNORTHCOM strategy should focus on two 
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important aspects.  First, the indirect support to the Mexican military will increase the 
operational abilities and capabilities of the Mexican military.  Second, the U.S. military 
strategy must be a supporting effort to the “whole-of-government approach” as outlined 
in the 2009 Counterinsurgency Guide and 2007 Merida Initiative (International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 2010). 
B. JUAREZ AND GOM STRATEGY  
The debate about the GOM strategy to end the violence from the Mexican drug 
war can be highlighted by studying the Mexican military deployment to Juarez.  
Observations of the Mexican military operations in Juarez provide specific areas where 
the USNORTHCOM strategy can support the GOM efforts.  More importantly, the 
primary question of what is the GOM strategy to decrease the violence from the Pack 
Virus in Mexico can be addressed. 
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IV. A LACK OF MEXICAN STRATEGY  
The violence in Mexico caused by the Pack Virus has created areas where 
Mexican police are incapable or reluctant to confront these illegal operations.  Currently, 
the Mexican military is being deployed to areas where police are unable to stop the 
increase in violence.  Reports of local police and the Mexican military fighting each other 
can be contributed to the Pack Virus’s efficiency at corrupting local officials (Sullivan, 
2009). Through the use of the Mexican military, the GOM is attempting to stop the 
violence and restore order to these areas.  The Mexican military has a tradition of being 
used in an internal role to disrupt civil unrest and to assist recovery efforts after major 
disasters.  The presumed goal of the GOM strategy is for the military to create conditions 
acceptable for the local police to operate.  
This chapter provides a perspective of the Mexican military as an institution of 
the GOM to be employed against the Pack Virus.  First, the likely Mexican strategy for 
dealing with the Pack Virus will be presented. Second, the historical perspective of the 
Mexican military depicts how the GOM chose the current strategy of utilizing the 
military as police.  Third, the two major threats of corruption and the Pack Virus will be 
discussed in order to give the reader the background for what the Mexican military faces.  
Fourth, the Juarez case study and the DOTMILPF7 (doctrine, organization, training and 
education, material solutions, intelligence, leadership, personnel, facilities) process will 
be used to dissect the separate parts of the Mexican military.  These sections will present 
the reader with an operational view of the lacking GOM strategy which neglects a whole-
of-government approach against the Pack Virus.    
A. MEXICO NATIONAL STRATEGY 
Mexico has deployed federal law enforcement, (the Secretaria de Seguridad 
Publica (SSP), and the military to respond to the increase of violence within Mexico.  
This is a tactic and not a strategy.  Effective national strategy comprises more than just 
                                                 
7 DOTMILPF is doctrine, organization, training, material solutions, leadership, personnel, facilities 
from FM1 (U.S. Army, 2005).  I have added the term intelligence. 
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the military.  It should utilize all the power of government including: diplomatic, 
informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-
FIL).  These are the means to achieve the national objectives as outlined from a U.S. 
perspective.  Within this framework of resources government can effectively counter 
national security threats.  Currently, the focus of GOM is on military and law 
enforcement operations to counter the non-state entities (Whitney, 2010). The narrow 
focus of GOM, human rights abuses by the military, and the mass murder of numerous 
teenagers in Juarez by a DTO have increased the criticism of this Mexican strategy 
(Wilkinson, 2010).  Focusing on the military response of the GOM strategy provides 
points for analysis.  More importantly, it highlights that national strategy must work with 
a unity of effort with all parts in order to be successful in countering non-state entities.  
The history of Mexico, and the Mexican military as an institution, creates an understating 
of how the GOM chose this course of action. 
B. HISTORICAL MEXICAN MILITARY PERSPECTIVE SINCE WWII 
Only once during WWII did the Mexican military cooperate with the American 
military.  The Mexican Air Force flew in support of the U.S. military in the Philippines in 
1945.  This small, but very valiant support by the Mexican military in WWII should be 
used to gain additional support for combined operations.  Lenchek writes about the 
coordinated efforts of the U.S. and Mexican military, “Mexican pilots received additional 
training in the United States and in 1945 fought valiantly in the air war in the 
Philippines” (Lenchek, 2001).  There is a historic foundation for the Mexican military to 
train and fight with the U.S. military against a common enemy. 
Now, the Mexican military is organized into two main forces: the Army 
(SEDENA) and the Navy (SEMAR).8  The Mexican Air Force is now organized under 
SEDENA.  Unlike the U.S. military, there is no civilian leadership like the Secretaries of 
Army or Navy.  The two services are independent and report to the President of Mexico 
for orders and direction.  
                                                 
8 SEDENA is the common Spanish acronym which is from Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional and 
SEMAR is the acronym from Secretaria de Marina.    
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As Mexico transformed through the 1960s and 1970s to a more democratic 
perspective and a nationalized industrial nation, the Mexican military remained focused 
on internal threats. As Wager writes:  
With the exception of World War II, Mexico's foreign policy, guided 
mainly by the principles of nonintervention, respect for self-determination, 
and a general disdain for military solutions to international problems, has 
virtually eliminated foreign military involvement or membership in 
alliance systems. Not surprisingly, therefore, the army primarily has 
focused on preserving internal security. (1994)  
In 1968, the Mexican military and police were used to stop student protests in 
Mexico City.  During protests on 2 October 1968, Army forces killed numerous students 
by shooting into the crowd of protestors, but the number remains in dispute 
(Schugurensky, 2005).  This over reaction by the GOM security forces, to the Mexican 
students’ protests in Mexico City, created a culture of animosity between cultural elites in 
the academic and political world and the Mexican Army.  This is similar to what 
happened following the Kent State shootings in America (Moreno, 2010).  Later, during 
the oil boom years of the 1970s, the modernization of the Mexican military continued 
with a focus on mobile forces that could respond within Mexico to crisis (Wager, 1994). 
In the aftermath of the Mexico City earthquake in 1985, the military deployed 
over 3000 troops to conduct relief and security operations (Wager, 1994).  Conducting 
civil actions or consequence management (CM) operations is one of the three main 
missions of the Mexican military.9  Consequence management operations “constitute 
actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster” (Lewis, Rowe, & Taylor, 1999).  Though the 
GOM was criticized for its response, the Mexican military gained support and more 
institutional credibility in the eyes of the Mexican people (Wager, 1994).  With more 
confidence in the military by the political elite, the military was deployed to southern 
Mexico (Chiapas) to intervene in the uprisings against the GOM in the early 1990s.  The 
Mexican military was not well trained in conducting counter insurgency operations and 
                                                 
9 The three missions of the Mexican military are civil action (consequence management), internal 
defense and maintain the Constitution and its laws (Wager, 1994). 
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did not perform well in Chiapas (Doyle, 2004).  The legacy of the Mexican military is 
that of an institution struggling against organized resistance. 
Traditionally, performing consequence management operations and possessing 
urban search and rescue capabilities, the Mexican military is considered a first responder 
for events in Mexico. The tragedy of hurricane Katrina created conditions that enabled 
political support for the Mexican military to deploy forces to New Orleans in order to 
assist in relief operations.  Both SEDENA and SEMAR deployed forces to support the 
U.S. military and relief efforts. (Renuart, 2010).  This was the first time since WWII that 
the Mexican military participated in operations outside of Mexico.   
Yet, this is not the only incident where SEMAR supported operations outside of 
Mexico.  SEMAR provided relief supplies for the massive hurricanes that hit Haiti in 
2008.  During Operation Unified Response in 2010, SEMAR supported relief operations 
after the major 7.0 earthquake that occurred in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (SOUTHCOM, 
2010).  Leveraging the traditional consequence management operations and the 
partnering of Mexican and United States military in recent operations creates 
opportunities for the two allies to work together on other issues. 
Partnering with the Mexican military as it transitions into a new institution 
enables USNORTHCOM to support our southern ally with a robust theater support 
engagement plan.  The development of the theater support plan should help the Mexican 
military address two main problems that it faces today: corruption and the violence 
caused by the non-state groups.  The Mexican military must confront these two major 
challenges at the strategic level in order for the GOM to prevail against the Pack Virus.   
C. CHALLENGES OF CORRUPTION AND VIOLENCE  
Currently the Pack Virus and corruption are the two greatest challenges to the 
Mexican military.  As Henson writes:  
Corruption occurs in Mexico more because of intimidation than some 
inherent weakness in the national character. Plata o Plomo—Silver or 
Lead—is the choice facing both local and federal officials, and the threat 
of a bullet is no joke. It doesn't matter who you are, the government can't 
protect you. (2008)  
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President Calderon has begun the difficult process of weeding out corruption, but 
many Mexican officials have conflicted loyalties.  Grillo writes, “The army and federal 
police have taken over police stations in several border cities this month, seizing the local 
force's guns while they root out corrupt officers” (2008).  The Mexican military is 
identified as one of the least corrupt organizations in Mexico and the people of Mexico 
respect them as an institution. The last seven years of research shows increasing levels of 
professionalism for the Mexican military when compared to 34 other federal institutions.  
A chart from Transparent Mexico, the local chapter of the non-government organization 
(NGO) Transparency International places the Mexican military fourth compared to local 
police at the bottom of the list (the thirty-fourth place) for corruption (Transparent 
Mexico, 2005).  Though the Mexican military is considered not to be as corrupt as other 
national institutions in Mexico, there is corruption within their ranks as the notorious 
Zetas demonstrate.  The corruption creates animosity between SEMAR and SEDENA in 
addition to security concerns for the theater security cooperation plan for both the U.S. 
and Mexico.  Partners, who cannot be trusted, are ineffective against the Pack Virus since 
collaboration and sharing information will be limited between organizations.  
1. Non-State Violence 
Mexico continues to show an increase in violence  caused by the conflict  between 
non-state entities to include drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s), transnational 
organized gangs (MS 13, Aztec Barrios),  and paramilitary groups (los Zetas) as they 
fight among themselves and the GOM for control of illegal trafficking routes.   In June 
2009, the LA Times reported over 45,000 soldiers and 5,000 federal police were 
deployed in the “war against traffickers.”  By November 2009, news sources were 
increasing the estimates to over 16,000 killed due to the drug violence within the last 
three years with over 6,290 killed in 2008. (Booth, 2009)  By April of 2010, reports 
estimated that over 22,700 people were killed due to the fighting.  (Castillo, 2010)   The 
violence caused by the Pack Virus is increasing as more Mexican troops are deploying to 
support law enforcement operations.   
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2. 4GW Tactics Have Marginalized the Mexican Military 
The non-state entities operating in Mexico are not considered terrorist groups as 
they do not possess the political goal of changing the Mexican government.  Yet, the 
DTOs are classified as narco-terrorists by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
(Holmberg, 2009). The non-state entities operate similarly to terrorist groups in that they 
operate with a clandestine transnational nature, utilizing a network framework to conduct 
tactical and operational control of illegal trafficking operations and utilize violent tactics 
to intimidate the local leaders and law enforcement.  As discussed in the literature review, 
Sullivan writes, “These groups while vastly different do rely on networks and in fact 
share several common characteristics. They have a propensity for indiscriminate 
violence, intimidation, coercion, transcending borders, and targeting nation-states” 
(Sullivan, 2007). 
These non-state groups are utilizing fourth generation warfare to marginalize the 
Mexican military.  Fourth generation warfare uses tactics that operate within the “grey 
area” between the division of law enforcement and the military.  Corruption, beheadings, 
intimidation, systematically murdering police, and coordinated attacks on the military 
area are all tactics of 4GW.  The Pack Virus in Mexico has used these tactics along with 
“swarm tactics” or small coordinated infantry attacks and IEDs to fight the police and the 
military.  One effective technique that the Pack Virus employs is signs with phone 
numbers to call in order to join their organization (Ware, 2009).  Not only can the Pack 
Virus recruit new members, but this sends an information operations (IO) message that 
these groups are so powerful that the GOM cannot even stop the Pack Virus from openly 
advertising in public for Mexican soldiers to join their organizations. Using these tactics 
has also caused a strategic problem for the GOM.  The GOM strategy of employing the 
military as law enforcement without applying other forms of state power has created a 
condition of increasing violence and additional troop deployments.  The correlation of 
more troops with more violence produces a dual strategic communications message that 
the Mexican military is failing against the Pack Virus and that the security threat appears 
to be growing.  
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D. MEXICO AND U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST 
There are numerous issues that distinguish these non-state groups as a national 
security priority to both Mexico and the U.S.  The growing and emerging security threat 
of Mexico to American national security was noted by Joint Forces Command.  Johnson 
writes, “In November, the Defense Department’s Joint Forces Command named Mexico 
as one of two countries, along with Pakistan, at the highest risk of “rapid collapse.” Such 
a collapse, it said, “would demand an American response based on the serious 
implications for homeland security alone” (2009).  In addition, former CIA director 
Hayden noted, “that Mexico was second only to Iran as a national threat to U.S. security” 
(Johnson, 2009).  Mexico is within the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area 
of responsibility.10  The Commander of USNORTHCOM delegated Joint Task Force-
North located in El Paso, Texas as the lead DoD unit supporting counter drug operations 
in Mexico.  Due to the threat from DTOs and illegal trafficking operations from Juarez, 
Joint Task Force-North is in a strategic location to observe the operational and tactical 
level effects of the Mexican military against the Pack Virus.  
It was the change in policy of President Calderon of the PAN (Mexico political 
party elected into the Officer of the President of Mexico in 2000, though President 
Calderon was elected in 2006) that created the violence in Mexico (Grayson, 2010).  
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. and Mexico did not have the same goals concerning theater 
cooperation and security.  Transnational non-state entities like the DTOs or Los Zetas or 
MS-13 were not confronted by the GOM under the PRI (political party that controlled 
Mexico from 1929 to 2000) in a systematic or unified effort (Grayson, 2010).  President 
Calderon change in policy created two distinct actions. First, he has confronted the 
corruption within the government of Mexico which has caused the status quo of allowing 
drug trafficking organizations to operate within Mexico to change.  Second, as he directly 
confronted the numerous drug cartels within Mexico, these organizations have increased 
the violence throughout Mexico in order to control illegal trafficking routes from other 
                                                 
10 Mexico, Canada, U.S., and Bahamas are the countries within the USNORTHCOM area of 
responsibility along with a few small islands off the coast of Nova Scotia that are still governed by the 
United Kingdom.  
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disrupted organizations.  In addition to the change in GOM national policy, the financial 
disruption from 9/11 and common security threats have created conditions which are high 
priorities for both Mexico and the United States governments to cooperate.  This 
cooperation and collaboration on shared security concerns increases the security within 
North America.  
E. MERIDA INITIATIVE SUPPORT TO THE MEXICAN MILITARY 
The current American/Mexican policy of combating the drug cartels is called the 
2007 Merida Initiative.  This was a critical first step in creating a real theater defense of 
North America.  The Merida Initiative, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, 
provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico in support of 
the fight against the drug cartels in Mexico.  Ambassador Garza, the U.S. ambassador to 
Mexico stated:  
The Merida Initiative represents a new era of cooperation which will 
amplify and strengthen existing law enforcement cooperation, intelligence 
sharing, and training programs. It will also provide new equipment for 
Mexican forces to use to better confront the common threat of drug 
trafficking and other transnational organized crime. (Mexico, U.S. 
Embassy, 2008) 
It is through the 2007 Merida Initiative that the U.S. military is able to provide 
indirect support to the Mexican military.  Indirect support includes enhanced military to 
military exchanges, exchanges of information through conferences, liaison officers, and 
training exercises.  Admiral Olson of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) testified 
that the use of indirect support to other militaries is critical in the fight against “violent 
extremist organizations” (Olson, 2009).  Disrupting non-state entities in Mexico is similar 
to disrupting transnational terrorist organizations and is now part of the theater 
engagement plan for NORTHCOM (Milardo, 2009).  
The U.S. provides intelligence, military, interagency partnering, and finance 
assistance to GOM in order to confront the DTOs (Mexico, U.S. Embassy, 2009).  With 
the support from the U.S., the GOM has changed the laissez faire policy of allowing drug 
trade organizations to operate uncontested in Mexico.  Through corruption and 
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intimidation the drug cartels have firmly established themselves as power brokers in 
specific areas of Mexico.  The change in policy of President Felipe Calderon to confront 
the powerful drug cartels and to begin the process of accountability among the 
government to help eliminate corruption are two major factors in the rise of violence 
between the non-state entities.   
F. JUAREZ 
The study for the battle of Juarez between the Mexican military and the Pack 
Virus highlights some of the strategic, operational, and tactical problems associated with 
sending military forces into cities to perform law enforcement  operations.  Though there 
is no published Mexican strategy to confront the Pack Virus, there are numerous 
examples of the Mexican military being deployed to areas where law enforcement is 
unable or unwilling to stop the violence caused by the Pack Virus.  One example of the 
Mexican military being used instead of the police is in Juarez.  
Ciudad Juarez, which is across the border from El Paso, is the most violent city in 
Mexico due to the “drug war.”  In Juarez, there were approximately seven killings a day 
or 2000 deaths, since the start of the 2009 year (MSNBC, 2009; Stevenson, 2009).  The 
proximity of Juarez to the U.S. border creates opportunities for international business and 
illegal trafficking operations to flourish.  In addition to legal commerce, the lucrative 
illegal smuggling trafficking routes cause this city to be a contested area between the 
GOM and the non-state entities fighting for control of illegal trafficking routes.  Gun 
battles between law enforcement and the Pack Virus have caused thousands of deaths.  
The gun battles are only part of the violence that has become part of the daily life in 
Juarez.  Kidnappings, extortion, intimidation, and assignations are also common 
occurrences.   
G. THE DOTMILPF MODEL APPLIED TO THE MEXICAN MILITARY  
Using the deployment of the Mexican military to Juarez and analyzing 
DOTMILPF (doctrine, organization, training and education, material solutions, 
intelligence, leadership, personnel, facilities) and techniques, tactics, and procedures 
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(TTPs) of the Mexican military provides the analysis for recommendations of a 
supporting USNORTHCOM Mexican strategy.  Even without creating a new GOM 
strategy and understanding the criticism of the Merida Initiative, the Mexican military is 
one institution that could be strengthened and used as the foundation for bettering 
Mexico.  Recognizing that a bad strategy can lead to poor performance must also be 
noted.  Relying only on the Mexican military to solve the problems of the DTO violence 
is not a successful strategy for defeating the DTOs. If the measure of performance of 
reduced violence within Mexico is the goal of the Mexican strategy, then the Mexican 
military is failing.  Non-state entities require the entire force of DIME-FIL (diplomacy, 
information, military, economic, finances, intelligence, and law enforcement) in order to 
counter this international non-state threat.  Diplomacy, information, military, economic, 
finances, intelligence, and law enforcement must be used to counter the threat of non-
state entities corrupting and intimidating local communities into allowing illegal 
trafficking operations in their areas.  The Mexican strategy is focusing only on military 
efforts to reinforce out gunned and corrupt police.   
The Mexican military can be dissected into parts in order to analyze a few specific 
areas of the strategic security approaches, which are being utilized to fight the Pack 
Virus.  Doctrine, organization, training, materiel solutions, intelligence, leadership and 
education, personnel and facilities (DOTMILPF) process will be utilized for the specific 
areas of inquiry into the Mexican military. Understanding these areas enables the 
functional areas of the Mexican security strategy to be discussed in detail.   
America is the best equipped and trained military in the world due to the 
DOTMILPF process and the enormous defense budget.  Mexico, on the other hand, is 
ranked nineteenth in the world according to globalfirepower.com, ahead of North Korea 
by one only place (Global Firepower, 2009).  No doubt, the DOTMILPF process would 
support the Mexican military’s ability to counter its current problems, particularly those 
in Juarez.   
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1. Doctrine 
Doctrine is the written and unwritten guide to action for any military.  This is 
developed from national strategy, historic, cultural, and policy decisions and contributes 
to the organization of the military.  Mexican military doctrine allows it to respond to 
national emergencies.  “Mexico's foreign policy, guided mainly by the principles of 
nonintervention” has dictated the doctrine of the military (Wager, 1994).  In addition, 
9/11 increased the awareness to the external security threats to Mexico and the U.S. by 
non-state entities.  The doctrine of the Mexican military is to provide for the defense of 
Mexico from external nations, response to natural disasters, and internal emergencies 
(Wager, 1994).  First, the Mexican external defense has been against the historic 
intrusions and invasions of the United States.  Second, the Mexican military has been 
used to assist in natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes.  Third, the Mexican 
military can be called upon for internal crisis, such as is occurring in Juarez.  The two 
reasons the Mexican military was sent to Juarez were that the non-state entities were 
openly killing the local police and these groups possessed more firepower and weapons 
than the police.  The utilization of the Mexican military as law enforcement in Juarez was 
within published doctrine.  However, there are Mexican politicians and generals who are 
concerned about the legality of the Mexican Army being utilized as police (Moreno, 
2010;Sanchez, 2010).  Doctrinal changes for the Mexican military include a change in 
laws that reflect the military or law enforcement (SSP) is in charge of operations.  There 
is no one organization in charge of operations in Mexico.  
2. Organization 
Organization is derived from doctrine.  SEDENA, commanded by a general, and 
SEMAR, commanded by an admiral, are separate organizations that have cultural and 
historical differences that neither allows for mutual support nor collaboration of lessons 
learned. There is no joint Department of Defense nor is there a civilian Secretary of 
Defense that unifies these organizations.  These divides create friction at the operational 
level and cause gaps in information exchange that can be exploited by the non-state 
entities at the tactical level.  One example, though it did not occur in Juarez, is when 
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SEMAR allowed the publishing of the name of a dead sailor, 3rd Petty Officer 
Melquisedet Angulo ,who was involved in the gun fight which killed, Beltrán Leyva, the 
leader of a splinter Sinaloa Cartel DTO (L. Cordoba , 2009) Afterwards, in retaliation, the 
cartel killed the family of the fallen sailor.  The lack of institutionalized knowledge about 
the expected retaliation against families of the fallen sailor is nothing that SEMAR had 
prior experience in knowing.  However, SEDENA experienced the failures of operational 
security and retribution attacks years before.  SEDENA experienced violent ambushes 
from corrupt local police forces, corrupt federal police, and paramilitary groups in 
previous years (Moreno, 2010).  If SEDENA could have warned SEMAR about 
operational security and retribution attacks, then the tragedy of Angulo may not have 
occurred. The lack of sharing of information is due to the cultural rifts between SEMAR 
and SEDENA because of the different missions, funding, historical cultural differences, 
and the geographical nature of the Navy and the Army.  
3. Training 
Training is honing of unit and personnel military skills.  Historically, the Mexican 
military has neither possessed a large budget nor training programs to prepare for counter 
insurgency or law enforcement operations (Moreno, 2010).  The Mexican military was 
not prepared to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) operations.  Utilizing military forces 
as law enforcement requires specific training and is most similar to preparing for COIN.  
The last time the Mexican military faced an enemy in a COIN environment was in 
southern Mexico (Chiapas) in the early 1990s.  It was not prepared then to fight an 
insurgency (Doyle, 2004).  More recently, the threat has been from natural disasters 
where the Mexican military had to respond in support of the GOM.  The Mexican 
military did not train to conduct law enforcement or COIN operations prior to Juarez in 
2007 (Grayson, 2010).  Due to this training deficiency, poor information operations and 
public affairs (PA), and a few illegal acts, the military has been accused of crimes against 
civilians.  The blunt hand of the military in COIN operations is a continuous theme 
throughout militaries of the world (Hoyt, 2004).  Training can eliminate and soften the 
hard hand of the military, but this requires change in doctrine, time, and experience to 
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successfully complete this transformation from blunt force to successful COIN 
operations.  Action taken in Juarez showcases the poor performance of the Mexican 
military when the metric of continued violence is used to determine success (L. Cordoba, 
2009).  
4. Material Solutions 
Materiel solutions are the equipment the military uses during missions.  The 
Merida Initiative provides the Mexican military with ion scanners, aircraft, night-vision 
goggles, small boats, and radars (Milardo, 2009).  These items only increase the 
capabilities of the Mexican military—if the military is properly trained to use the 
equipment. America is great at providing the material solutions as the Merida Initiative 
showcases.  Unfortunately, increasing the capabilities for the Mexican military with 
material solutions is only one part needed to strengthen it.  At the tactical level, the 
Mexican military is already better equipped than the non-state entities fighting for control 
in Juarez.  Material solutions and support from the U.S. in technology and specialized 
equipment should be sustained.  Mexico has the majority of military equipment need to 
sustain operations against the non-state entities. 
5. Intelligence 
Intelligence is the processing of information to help make decisions.  Intelligence 
is a broad area that includes: systems, human, signal, imagery, and electronic 
intelligence.  All of these make up the separate parts of the intelligence system.  Human 
intelligence is the highest priority and must also be employed to fight illegal trafficking 
operations in Juarez.  Unable to trust the local police due to corruption, human sources 
will need to be developed in order to fight the DTOs.  The Mexican military will take 
time to develop these human assets in Juarez, since establishing human collection assets 
requires access and time (Lowenthal, 2009).  The U.S. has promised through the Merida 
Initiative to share information with GOM.  In fact, DHS has “a Letter of Intent to develop 
a coordinated and intelligence-driven response to the threat of cross border smuggling 
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and trafficking of weapons and ammunition” (DHS, 2009).  The Mexican military is 
failing to employ all areas of intelligence to defeat the non-state entities. 
6. Leadership and Education 
Leadership and education encompass mentorship, scholarship, and training.  The 
lack of training academies for the professional military education of the Mexican military 
is one major obstacle within the Mexican system.  Mentorship from outside of Mexico 
has not occurred due to the past “historical non intervention policies” (Wager, 1994).  In 
addition, the internal mentoring, though very strong, has a limited effect when numerous 
high level personnel are suspected of being corrupt.  The Mexican military when ordered 
to intervene in Juarez did not have the leadership or education to operate in a law 
enforcement or counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. After the initial failures and 
allegations of human right abuses, SEDENA has gone to static road blocks as the tactic of 
choice to disrupt the non-state entities. (Sanchez, 2010)  At many levels the Mexican 
military is improving through execution of mission, but not in an exponential way, due to 
lack of leadership at all levels.  Similar to the Chiapas uprising, SEDENA was 
unprepared for operations against the Pack Virus, even though one of the four national 
plans was devoted to operations against DTOs (Wager, 1994).  Failing to execute an 
operations plan is a sign of poor leadership and staff planning.    
7. Personnel 
Personnel are the lifeblood of any organization.  The corruption of the Mexican 
government is a profound problem for the Mexican Army. Time reporter Grillo writes, 
“One entire unit of army special forces deserted in the late 1990s to form a paramilitary 
group called the Zetas, who worked as bloody enforcers to help the Gulf Cartel get the 
edge over its rivals” (2008). As the Zetas example showcases, non-state entities are 





then sell their capability to the drug cartels.  The Zetas actually advertise for the military 
to join the Zetas using billboards and posters (Ware, 2009) (see Figure 2). This is a 




Figure 2.   Photo 1: Los Zetas Recruiting (From Los Zetas, 2008) 
Once recruited, the Mexican military must retain the best and brightest through 
education, pay, and providing facilities for their families.  Increasing the quality of 
personnel of the Mexican military will decrease the corruption within Mexico.  The 
Mexican military, which has the means to fight the drug cartels, is less influenced by the 
cartels compared to Mexican law enforcement as the military is a product of all of 
Mexico and not from a local populace.  Liaison officers from the Mexican military 
                                                 
11 The Los Zetas sign reads: “’Operative Group‘ Los Zetas wants you, soldier or ex-soldier. We offer 
good salary, food and care for your family. You don’t have to suffer mistreatment and hunger anymore. We 
don’t give you to eat cheap microwave soups. Conflictive men, please don’t call.” (Translation by Rodrigo 
Nieto Gomez 30 July 2010) 
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should take a polygraph test and be vetted by the Mexican and American intelligence to 
increase the likelihood of catching corrupt officers.  Utilizing polygraphs would eliminate 
some “bad apples” and raise the standards across the Mexican military—and thus the 
entire Mexican federal government.   
The Mexican military has enough personnel to sustain the fight against non-state 
entities.  Institutional strength and credibility can be gained through use of polygraphs 
and vetting all of the military members.  The U.S. can help with training additional 
investigators, polygraph operators, and maintenance specialists assigned to sensitive 
equipment. 
8. Facilities 
Facilities are the bases and the infrastructures on the military bases which the 
military utilizes everyday to live, work, and play.  These secure locations offer the 
Mexican military a place to keep families safe, fed, and housed.  The Angulo case may 
not have happened if the Mexican military had better facilities protecting the families and 
reducing the opportunities for corruption.   
Facilities and bases must be improved to separate the military from retaliation and 
in order to provide secure areas for training.  Until these facilities are built in Mexico, the 
Mexican military could utilize training bases in the U.S. to develop and prepare troops for 
deployment.  Utilizing the historical Mexico/U.S. WWII model of pilot training would 
require changes in both GOM and U.S. policies that are not within the 2007 Merida 
Initiative.  Fortunately, there is nothing forbidding the training of Mexican forces in the 
U.S. within the Merida Initiative. 
9. Measure of Effectiveness/Measure of Performance  
After analyzing the Mexican DOTMILPF process, the Mexican military can be 
judged against the performance of mission accomplishment and the reduction in violence.  
Utilizing the Measure of performance of increased deployed forces in support of law 
enforcement creates a failure of the measure of effectiveness to reduce violence within 
Juarez.  The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System defines measure of 
 49
effectiveness as “metrics used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and 
execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the 
performance measurement” (Defense Acquisition University, 2006).  Measures of 
performance are “the process whereby an organization establishes the parameters within 
which programs, investments, and acquisitions are reaching the desired results” (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture , 2007)  
Measure of performance factors of less violence, additional arrests or captures, 
and conducting effective information operations of the Mexican military are not 
consistent.  Currently, violence in Juarez has escalated since the deployment of the 
Mexican military to the region (L. Cordoba, 2009).  Using deaths from the drug war 
throughout Mexico as the metric to determine success, the Mexican military is not 
producing quick results (Bricker, 2009). Yet, the Mexican military has been effective in 
increasing the numbers of leaders captured, members detained, and corrupt officials 
removed are improving as compared to the past (K. Cordoba, 2009).  The Mexican 
military is performing poorly at information operations when most news reports are about 
the increase in violence.  In addition, some critics have labeled the drug war a failure 
(Bowden, 2010).  The lack of effective information operations highlights the inability of 
the Mexican military to counter the negative messages.  Information operations are a 
critical component of any COIN strategy and are a must for defeating 4GW.  Lastly, 
recognizing that the non-state entities could be degraded through COIN operations is not 
a concept that the Mexican military seems to recognize as a possible course of action to 
defeat the non-state entities currently fighting fourth generation warfare in Mexico.   
All measures of performance must consider the limited amount of time that the 
Mexican military and the GOM have invested into defeating the non-state entities.  Time 
is one critical component to defeating the non-state entities groups.  According to Jones, a 
professor at Naval Postgraduate School, “Successful counter insurgency operations 
against groups averages about fourteen years” (2010).  Mexico has national elections in 
2012, and the political will for the military only approach to ending the violence from the 
non-state entities may not be sustained past this time.  For the Mexican military to be able 
to continue the fight and defeat the non-state entities, the political will must be sustained 
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through the next Mexican election cycle in 2012. This will require political and 
diplomatic efforts within the GOM and the United States to sustain the fight.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The Mexican military was not prepared nor trained to conduct COIN operations in 
order to identify, locate, and capture members of the Pack Virus.  Better equipped than 
their adversary, the Mexican military offered an immediate solution to GOM for the 
outgunned and corrupt local police.  Though the Mexican military followed doctrine, it is 
outdated due to globalization and the current threat from non-state entities.  The military 
doctrine and organization needs to be improved.  Constructing a JTF like system, but not 
a replica of the U.S. military, will serve to break down the cultural barriers and to 
facilitate improved information exchanges.  
The measures of performance for the Mexican military relate to the measure of 
effectiveness for the GOM strategy to only utilize the military.  If the Mexican military 
fails, then the entire Mexican strategy fails.  This is the critical vulnerability of the GOM 
strategy.  In addition, this is a constraint that must be acknowledged by the U.S. 
government.  Restrained by the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. government can support 
the GOM strategy by strengthening the Mexican military, supporting the extradition of 
DTO leaders for prosecution in the U.S. and preparing for the escalation of violence in 
the U.S.     
Policy recommendations from the analysis of the Mexican DOTMILPF require 
that the Mexican military improve in order to be more effective against the Pack Virus.  
Tactically, the Mexican military can win battles against the Pack Virus (Sherman & 
Olson, 2010); however, winning the tactical gun battles against the Pack Virus fighting 
fourth generation warfare is not a real measure of success.  Operationally and 
strategically the challenges of time, political will, corruption of local officials, and lack of 
a reliable judicial system will hamper any military efforts.    
Most of these measures of performance in the DOTMILPF can be addressed 
through indirect support by the U.S. military as outlined in the Merida Initiative.  The use 
of indirect U.S. military support creates opportunities to disrupt these non-state entities 
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prior to these groups conducting fourth generation warfare in America.  In addition, a 
stronger, more capable Mexican military strengthens this institution within Mexico.  This 
enables the GOM to have a shield against the corruption as the GOM builds a foundation 
for the other pieces of the government strategy.  Similarly, the London School of 
Economics reports about institutional development in Kosovo, where even though it has 
major issues unrelated to Mexico in ethnic genocide and threats from neighboring 
countries, the common issues of poor economic conditions, corruption, transnational 
crime, inefficient judicial system, and mistrust in institutions and political leaders still 
applies (Aliu, 2007).  The report describes establishing security as a foundation for other 
systems to build upon, it emphasized, “the need to improve the education and health 
systems to promote economic growth, and found that the judiciary—widely perceived as 
inefficient, and not sufficiently capable or independent—is a source of growing mistrust 
in institutions and political leaders” (Aliu, 2007). 
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V. FINDINGS 
The Pack Virus is perpetuating violence in Mexico.  After reviewing the literature 
and analyzing the effectiveness of the Mexican military there is no clear and coherent 
GOM strategy for defeating the Pack Virus.  One operational condition is present: the 
GOM continues to reinforce or replace law enforcement throughout Mexico with 
SEMAR and SEDENA.  No matter how ineffective the GOM strategy appears, a 
desirable end state is achievable with support from the United States.  The U.S. 
involvement in Colombia contributed to a reduction in violence throughout the country.  
Similar support to Mexico may make a difference in the ongoing “drug war” in Mexico. 
Reducing the violence is the measure of performance, which the Mexican military 
will be judged by in the eyes of the Mexican people, politicians, and the media.  Even so, 
caution is advised.  A reduction in violence does not necessarily mean that the GOM has 
defeated the Pack Virus.  The Pack Virus could have defeated the competition in the 
specific region or have penetrated and corrupted the GOM in order to operate 
unmolested.  Fortunately, the 2007 Merida Initiative has created conditions for the U.S. 
military to interact and share information with the Mexican military in order to support it 
in the 4GW fight.  Limited by the conditions of the Merida Initiative and U.S. laws, the 
U.S. military through USNORTHCOM can provide indirect and direct support to the 
Mexican military. 
In this chapter, a comparison of funding for the Merida Initiative and Plan 
Colombia will be presented.  Figure 6 illustrates the correlation between funding and a 
reduction in violence associated with the activities of the DTOs and Pack Virus over 
time.  The next set of charts depicts the levels of violence as it pertains to Colombia and 
Mexico.  These relate to the security situations in both countries.  For Colombia, it is a 
positive reduction in violence, but for Mexico the violence is increasing in correlation 
with the introduction of more military and federal police.  Figure 7 depicts the differences 
between some of the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) required in a 
conventional, counter insurgency, and fourth generation warfare conflict. 
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A. MERIDA INITIATIVE FUNDING 
A more detailed study of Tables 2 and 3 offers answers to some of the metrics 
identified in the methodology section.  The answers are highlighted by 
color/underline/italics: 
• How much money was invested into Plan Colombia and 2007 Merida 
Initiative?   
• What areas were funded in Plan Colombia compared to 2007 Merida 
Initiative? 
Table 2.   Bailey’s Contexts and Characteristics of Plan Colombia and the Merida 
Initiative (After Bailey, 2009)  
 Plan Colombia Merida Initiative 
Country  
context 
Population 45 M*; 1.14 M. 
sq. km.; GDP=US$250B* 
(2008); GDP/cap=US$5,174; 
budget expend=US$65B; 
unitary, with significant 
decentralization; 32 
departments, 1,100 counties 
Population 110 M; 1.97 M. sq. km.; 
GDP=US$1,142B (2008); 
GDP/cap=US$10,747; budget 
expend=US$227B; federal, with 32 
states, 1,400 counties 
Problem profile Major guerrilla insurgencies; 
generalized violence; major 
producer & trafficker of illicit 
drugs; limited central 
government presence; 
corruption in police-justice 
system 
Minor regional rebellion; producer 
& major trafficker of illicit drugs; 
rapid upsurge in trafficking 
violence; localized challenges to 
government presence; acute 
corruption in police-justice system 
Policy origins 1999–2000; U.S. proactive in 
policy design 
2007–2008; U.S. reactive in policy 
design 
Policy scope: 
goals & countries 
Internal security & anti-
trafficking; social justice; 
development. Primary= 
Colombia; secondary=Peru & 
Ecuador 
Internal security; law enforcement & 
justice admin.; Primary=Mexico; 
secondary=Central America & 
Caribbean 
Policy targets Insurgency (FARC; ELN); 
self-defense organizations; 
drug crop eradication; 
criminal justice system; 
economic development (e.g., 
crop substitution) 
Counter-drug; counter-terror; 
border security; public security & 
law enforcement; institution-
building & rule of law 
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 Plan Colombia Merida Initiative 
Time 
commitment 
2000–2006; succeeded by 
similar follow-on policies 
Fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 
2010, with indications of extension 
U.S. financial 
commitment 
US$4.5B; U.S. currently 
seeks reduced commitment 
US$1.5 B announced; approx. 10% 
program costs;—appropriated in 
2008; negotiations expected in 




Reduce drug demand “Genuine partnership;” Reduce drug 
demand; halt: weapons trafficking, 
precursor chemicals, money 
laundering 
 
Though there is some difference in the total amount of Plan Colombia, the cost 
estimate ranges from 4.5 billion to over 7.5 billion dollars (Sneyd, 2009; Ungerman, 
2003). This is considerably higher than what Bailey lists. In addition, the consistent 
estimate for the 2007 Merida Initiative is 1.4 billion dollars for three years with 300 
million dollars appropriated over those three years for military equipment (Milardo 
author year only 2009). This study will use the average of six billion dollars in funding 
for Plan Colombia with a population of 45 million over a six-year period as the estimate 
for funding compared to the Merida Initiative which is funded over a three-year period 
with 1.4 billion dollars and a Mexican population of 110 million.  Simple calculations 
determine that Plan Colombia was funded to twice the level in a 6 year period; six billion 
dollars over six years compared to 1.4 billion dollars for three years. (Bailey, 2009)  Once 
the percentage is adjusted for population, the amount of funding is 5.2 times as much.  A 
$133 per person in Colombia compared to a $25.4 per person for Mexico.  Plan Colombia 
was clearly generously funded as compared to the Merida Initiative.  
Table 3 depicts the amounts and type funded programs, the numbers of military 
advisors, and the lead federal agency in charge of developing the plan.  
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*2 Ware reports the training of Mexican Special Forces by U.S. military (Ware, 
2009); the actual numbers s are classified.  
B. LEAD AGENCY 
The lead agency in developing Plan Colombia was DoD.  Though it is difficult to 
quantify the correlation between lead agency and funding priorities the two plans are 
quite different in the amount and types of programs funded.  The development of Plan 
Colombia by DoD emphasized large funding to the Colombian military and security 
forces.  The Department of State (DOS) developed the 2007 Merida Initiative and the 
majority of funds are to DOS programs for the Mexican justice system compared to the  
Mexican military.  The best year-to-year detailed military funding of Merida is in the 
following slide from the proposed USNORTHCOM Theater Security Cooperation plan 
(Milardo, 2009). 12 
                                                 


































1. Bell 412 helos 
(8) $104M
2. CASA CN-235 
(2) $100M
3. Ion scanners 
$1.5M
1. Bell 412 helos
(5) $66M
2. CASA CN-235 (1) 
$50M
3. Ion scanners  
(15) $.5M
4. INL Funded:
• (1) NIIE ($2M) 
• (30) ion scanners 
($1M)




1.  Bell 412 helos (3) 
$39M
1.  MH-60S 
helos
(6-8)
Status Amended 1. Dec 09 delivery
2. Dec 10 delivery
3. Current delivery
Not approved - Awaiting funding
- FY09 Supp (Jun 09) 
Congress  approved 
$260M for (3) add’l




18 Jun 09  
Figure 3.   DoD Merida Initiative Funding (From U.S. Northern Command, 2010) 
Figure 4 depicts the actual amounts spent in 2008, the projected amount of money 
that was to have been spent in 2009, and the amount that possibly will be spent in 2010.  
The numbers of aircraft are still uncertain at this time. As shown in Figure 4, the 
approved amount of funding did not exceed 40 million dollars of military to military 
funding in 2009 (U.S. Northern Command, 2010).  Unfortunately, 2009 recorded the 
most deaths from violence in Mexico and was also the least funded year of FMF funding 
(U.S. Northern Command, 2010).13  This appears to be an unfortunate coincidence, as the 
two levels are not correlated.    
                                                 
13 As of August 2010, reported numbers by the government of Mexico estimated the current death toll 
over 28,000 killed due to the “offensive against the country’s drug cartels” since December 2006 
(Latindispatch.com, 2010).  
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C. INCREASED LEVEL OF SECURITY  
Figures 4 and 5 depict the comparison of the levels of security during the years of 
U.S. involvement in Colombia.    
There is still violence occurring in Colombia.  As long as the FARC is actively 
engaged in violent resistance and guerilla warfare with the government of Colombia, the 
country will have sustained levels of violence. However, the FARC and the main DTOs 
within Colombia have been degraded by up to 90 percent of capability. (Kushner, 2009).  
With U.S. assistance and funding, Colombia has improved security and increased the 
capacity and capabilities of the security forces.  Utilizing the measure of performance of 
improved security, Plan Colombia has been a success.  For Mexico, best practices from 
Plan Colombia can be implemented to reduce the violence in Mexico and make the 
Merida Initiative a success.     
The reduction in violence in Colombia is directly related to the amount of funding 
and support that was received by Colombia from the U.S.  Over a 10 year period, the U.S. 
funded and supported Colombia security forces through Plan Columbia  Figure 5 depicts 




















Figure 4.   Plan Colombia Reduction of Violence (After Colombian Ministry of 
Defense, 2009) 
Regarding the question about security, there is a measurable increase in 
Colombian security over the five-year period.  There is a correlation between the 
increased funding and the decrease in violence in Colombia from 2000 till 2005.  Other 
researchers have reported a lower homicide rate than the Colombian Ministry of Defense 
Report (Gonzalbo, 2009; Ramsey, 2009). Since the peak in 1991, the homicide rate is 
lower by 60 percent (Gonzalbo, 2009).  Once U.S. intervention began, the level of 
violence and the numbers of incidents are fewer than before the intervention.  In addition, 
the Combat Studies Institute states, “Between 1998 and 2008, Colombian security forces 
dramatically improved as they moved from what many considered the brink of disaster to 




things contributed more than material support and advisors, “The importance of being 
treated with professional respect and the value of interacting with U.S. military 
personnel” (Ramsey, 2009). 
With material support and advisors from the US, the Colombian military received 
a wide spectrum of training. Ramsey writes:  
Training for the security forces took many forms—individual, group, and 
unit—and addressed numerous topics: infantry skills, special operations, 
helicopter pilots and mechanics, combat life-saving, riverine operations, 
military decision making, intelligence, civil affairs, psychological 
operations, military law, and human rights to name a few. Human rights 
received the greatest emphasis. (Ramsey, 2009) 
In addition to the wide spectrum of military training, Ramey identifies the essence 
of training between the Americans and the Colombians when he writes, “The rigor and 
problem-solving approach of the Americans and their insistence on integrated planning, 
helped in organizing and coordinating, improved Colombian security efforts” (Ramsey, 
2009).  Understanding the host nation’s perspective is a key component to providing 
indirect military support to security forces.  Employing these practices as part of the 
interaction with Mexico could improve the security forces within Mexico similar to the 
transformation of the Colombian forces.   
D. MEXICO  
The correlation between increased military forces and increased violence is a 
direct result of the change in policy of President Calderon in December 2006.  From 
President Calderon’s attempt to limit the power of the drug cartels, violence increased as 
the Pack Virus reacted to the change in status quo.  From the beginning of the 2006, 
GOM policy change the violence within Mexico has increased.  This is prior to the 2007 
Merida Initiative agreement.  Though the Mexican approach has not lowered the violence 
to date, the concept of providing security is a foundation for any strategy.  Critics of 
Merida are incorrect when blaming it with increasing the violence in Mexico (Whitney, 
2010).  The Merida Initiative provides the foundation for support to Mexico from the 
U.S. 
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There are increasing deaths in Mexico due to the Pack Virus fighting for control 
of illegal trafficking routes between themselves and the GOM. By April 2010, estimates 
of over 22,000 people have been killed in Mexico due to the “drug war” (Castillo, 2010).  
Figure 6 depicts the increase of deaths with the increase of military forces deployed over 
time.    
 
Figure 5.   Mexico Violence 
The red lines indicate the numbers of military deployed and the blue line the 
number of deaths due to the violence.  In 2009, almost 10,000 Mexicans died from the 
violence caused by the Pack Virus fighting over control of illegal trafficking routes.  
Though statistics are not complete for 2010, the rate of violence is above the amount for 
2009 from January 2010 till March 2010.  This upward trend of violence has not reached 
a plateau even with the addition of more troops deployed to fight the cartels.  Reviewing 
metrics from previous U.S. military engagements with militant groups shows an increase 
 62
of violence once military personnel are deployed.  Using the past experience of the two 
Fallujah battles in April and November of 2004, the surge of 2007 in Iraq, and operations 
in Maraj, Afghanistan in 2010 as models, it confirms that an increase of violence occurs 
once additional troops are deployed to troubled areas (Ricks, 2009).  However, after a 
period of time, the violence plateaus.  Yet, in the case of Mexico, there is no 
distinguishable plateau of violence observed.      
E. TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES (TTPS) 
Throughout the first four chapters, the differences in techniques, tactics, and 
procedures (TTPs) s between conventional military operations and those required in a 
counter insurgency and 4GW conflict were discussed.  The tactics, techniques, and 
procedures needed in an asymmetric fight against the Pack Virus are shown in Table 7.  
These align closely with COIN operations vice conventional forces.  
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Table 4.   Conventional vs. Asymmetric Warfare  
 
 
The reenergizing and transforming the Mexican military into a national institution 
that can defeat the Pack Virus and reduce the violence in Mexico requires that a shift 
away from conventional operations must occur. As Table 7 depicts, the employing 
conventional military forces against the Pack Virus is not ideal.  Additional Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), Information Operations, and military intelligence units are 
needed to work within the “gray area” where the Pack Virus operates.  These military 
forces must be able to work with partners within the GOM to insure that the GOM 
strategy has a designed transition from military to law enforcement operations.  Winning 
the military fight against the Pack Virus requires a reduction of violence, the 
establishment of credible law enforcement, and a functional GOM criminal justice system 
in order to prosecute and imprison leaders and supporters of the Pack Virus. 
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F. CONCLUSION   
Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative are not funded equally.  Not surprisingly, 
the violence in Mexico is increasing even as the violence in Colombia decreases.  In 
order for Mexico to be successful in the military fight against the Pack Virus, the 
Mexican military must transform from a conventional army into a modern counter 
insurgency force.  Through the framework of the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. can 
assist Mexico in the transformation of the Mexican military through funding, military to 
military exchanges, and indirect support to the Mexican military.     
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VI. PROPOSED DOD/USNORTHCOM STRATEGY 
A. 2007 MERIDA INITIATIVE AND 2009 COUNTER INSURGENCY 
STRATEGY 
The Merida Initiative 2007, signed by President Bush and President Calderon, 
provides the framework for the cooperation between America and Mexico, supporting the 
fight against the drug cartels in Mexico (Roberts & Walser, 2007). The 2009 Counter 
Insurgency Guide outlines a “whole-of-government approach” for the U.S. government to 
support the fight against non-state entities (U.S. Department of State, 2009).  These two 
documents provide guidance to USNORTHCOM in the development of a strategy to 
support the U.S. State Department and the government of Mexico in the fight against the 
Pack Virus in Mexico.  The best practices from analysis and the Mexican military 
deployment experience create opportunities for the development of the USNORTHCOM 
strategy. 
B. USNORTHCOM STRATEGY FOR MEXICAN/U.S. SECURITY 
COOPERATION  
Currently, USNORTHCOM does not have a strategy to support U.S. strategic 
interests involving the Mexican military or the GOM.  Though the funding for the 2007 
Merida Initiatives ends in 2011, major modifications to the initiative are not foreseen as 
the Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s policies (Grillo, 
2009). Any strategy involving Mexico must take into account the cultural sensitivities or 
the political acceptability 14 of the Mexican people and military and the level of 
corruption throughout Mexico.    
The first challenge of collaboration and sharing between the Mexican and U.S. 
militaries is the lack of established trust between organizations (Covey, 2008). 
Historically, the two militaries have fought against each other.  The Mexican-American 
                                                 
14 Political acceptability is a term used by Eugene Bardach (2000) in the Practical Guide for Policy 
Analysis. 
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War is just one of numerous times the two countries have used their military against the 
other.  Almost a century has passed since the last time the U.S. invaded Mexico (Vera 
Cruz in 1914), but animosity within the Mexican military exists to having the U.S. 
assistance (Moreno, 2010).  The U.S. has not gained Mexican territory since 1848, yet it 
is this history of conflict, cultural differences, and the different world perspectives of 
American intervention and Mexican isolation between the two organizations, which must 
be overcome in order for the two to collaborate effectively.  The security cooperation 
between Mexico and the U.S. must work to counter common threats for both nations and 
to reinforce the Mexican legacy of “preserving internal security” (Wager, 1994). The 
common threats for both Mexico and America include: terrorism, drug cartels controlling 
territory, illegal trafficking (human, drug, weapons, and money smuggling), maritime and 
air domain situational awareness, and critical infrastructure defense. In addition, the 
consequence management roles of the Mexican and U.S. military during natural disasters 
constitute critical components to accomplishing the mission of homeland defense and 
security.  
The USNORTHCOM Mexican strategy must take into account the scale of 
corruption in Mexico at all levels of government.  Fortunately, the Mexican military is 
one of the least corrupt institutions within Mexico (Newsmax.com, 2005).  As reported in 
the international press by Newsmax, “The [Mexican] military—historically rallying point 
of Mexican nationalism—was long viewed as relatively free of the kind of corruption that 
has engulfed the country and many of its institutions” (2009).  Interaction with the 
Mexican military could lead to information loss to the Pack Virus through intimidation or 
corruption of Mexican officials.  This concern can be mitigated through proper 
intelligence vetting, administration of polygraphs, and implementation of internal 
security procedures. 
C. USNORTHCOM IN A SUPPORTING ROLE 
The U.S. national strategy must be articulated at the highest levels as to what end 
state is desired for all the organizations working in collaboration. The U.S. national 
strategy comprises more than just the military.  It utilizes all the power of the United 
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States to include: diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and 
law enforcement (DIME-FIL) means to achieve the national objectives. The DOS should 
provide the national level guidance for engagement with Mexico as the lead federal 
agency. The Department of Defense will publish its guidance to the combatant 
commanders for theater engagement based on many published plans including: the 
Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF),15 the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) and the National Security Strategy 2010 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008; 
Office of the President of the United States of America, 2010). Thus, the 
USNORTHCOM strategy for Mexico in a supporting role must provide some tools and a 
foundation to increase the capability and credibility of the Mexican military.  As 
identified in the literature review, there is a lack of either a classified or an unclassified 
DOS end state for interacting with Mexico.  Commander’s guidance and some 
assumptions as to where the USNORTHCOM strategy should steer is provided by the 
former Commander USNORTHCOM. Air Force General Gene Renuart:   
The threats facing the United States take on many faces: terrorists and 
terror groups, nation states, drug cartels, uncontrolled immigration and 
natural and man-made disasters…The enemy seeks to attack the seams 
and gaps in American defenses…These seams are between areas—such as 
the boundary between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern 
Command; agencies like those between the departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security; and domains such as space and maritime. (2009)  
The USNORTHCOM strategy on Mexico must address the gap that the 
commander describes in testimony to Congress.  This includes the 2000-mile 
international border with Mexico and the sea approaches of the Gulf of Mexico.  In 
addition, the commander lists the four common threats that should be addressed with 
Mexico including: terrorist groups, drug cartels (DTOs), uncontrolled immigration, and 
natural and man-made disasters. Others however, view the threat differently.  University 
of Houston history professor John Mason Hart would argue the U.S. national strategy is a 
“losing strategy,” and that there should be less funding of the Mexican military. He 
states, “The U.S. needs to focus more on limiting the demand for drugs and less on 
                                                 
15 The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) is a classified document.  It establishes the 
priorities for the services and assigns responsibilities for the combatant commanders. 
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militarizing Mexico” (Hillen, 2009).  In addition to Hart, Corcoran writes that the Merida 
Initiative is another attempt for the U.S. to influence Mexico through military means vice 
the stated goals of strengthening the GOM criminal justice system (Corcoran, 2010)   
However, the evidence does not support the critics.  As listed in Figure 4, the 
Merida Initiative provides the majority of the funding to development of the Mexican 
criminal justice system not the Mexican military.  Until there is a change to the U.S. 
national strategy, the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy must support the national 
strategy and fulfill the commander’s guidance.   
The USNORTHCOM theater strategy should emphasize the supporting role of the 
U.S. military by focusing on enhancing the capabilities of consequence management, 
military training, mentorship, increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) collection, maritime and air sovereignty situational awareness, and command and 
control. As stated in an AP release, President Obama said, “We are going to be dealing 
not only with drug interdiction coming north, but also working on helping to curb the 
flow of cash and guns going south” (MSNBC, 2009) With no published change to the 
Bush administration’s policy towards Mexico, except for more law enforcement activities 
directed towards the Mexican border, the planning assumption of increasing the 
professionalism of the Mexican military as an institution in Mexico will be an enabling 
objective to achieve the overall national goal of stabilizing and then diminishing the drug 
violence in Mexico.  
Though P. Corcoran writes that there is “no GOM strategy” to reduce the violence 
in Mexico, a USNORTHCOM strategy is still needed in order to support the efforts of the 
Mexican military (2010).  One known component of the GOM strategy is deploying the 
Mexican military to fight the DTOs.  These deployments, if successful, should eventually 
allow the refocusing of the Mexican military on defense and enable the Mexican law 
enforcement to deal with the Pack Virus.  The endstate for the USNORTHCOM strategy 
for Mexico is a more capable and professional Mexican military.  A more professional 
Mexican military can be achieved through increasing the efficiency of the Mexican 
military to conduct counter insurgency (COIN) operations through supporting the 
Mexican DOTMILPF process as described in Chapter IV.   
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Utilizing the 2007 Merida Initiative objectives as a catalyst, USNORTHCOM 
identified eight functional areas to increase the Mexican military’s capabilities in the near 
future. These eight functional areas include: air and maritime surveillance, intelligence 
collection, command and control network hardware and software, interdiction 
capabilities, consequence management, special operations, and institutional development 
(Milardo, 2009).  The continued support to these eight functional areas will increase the 
capabilities of the Mexican military in each of the four common threat areas as outlined 
by the commander USNORTHCOM.  In addition, USNORTHCOM should leverage its 
vast knowledge of systems and procedures to teach planning and mission analysis to the 
Mexican military at all levels.  The eight functional areas already funded through Merida 
bond to increasing specific capabilities gaps of the Mexican military.  These same 
capabilities are required in a counterinsurgency (COIN) and 4GW conflict.   Compared to 
current Mexican military doctrine, the increase in capabilities of the eight functional 
areas will enable the Mexican military to observe, report, and interdict air and maritime 
trafficking operations within Mexico.  
D. WAYS: UTILIZING THE AMERICAN DOTMILPF PROCESS  
As explained in Chapter IV, the American military is the best in the world due to 
a process of doctrine, organization, training, materiel solutions, leadership, education, 
intelligence, personnel and facilities (DOTMILPF) and the enormous defense budget. 
Understanding these areas enables the functional areas of the Mexico strategy to be 
discussed in detail. Also, understanding the constraints that the Mexican military brings 
to the cooperative efforts enables the strategy to avoid these obstacles.  
1. Doctrine and Organization  
The doctrine and organizational constraints of the Mexican military due to laws 
and historic perspective must be taken into consideration. Doctrine is a cornerstone for 
the foundation of any military organization. Understanding that the USNORTHCOM 
strategy can only influence and not change the basics of the Mexican military on how its 
doctrine is written and organizational chart is created allows for a start in discussions to 
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improve efficiency and capabilities. Typically, capability brings credibility and trust 
(Covey, 2008). This is similar to the development of the new Iraqi Army when building 
credibility was more important than being capable (Ricks, 2009). During operations in Ar 
Ramadi, Iraq in 2005, the Iraqi military faced similar problems of credibility in the eyes 
of the Iraqi people.  During a brief to his staff Colonel Smith spoke about credibility, “At 
times building credibility is more important than being capable” (2005). If the Mexican 
military has the credibility of being professional, honest, loyal to the constitution and not 
a person, and thus not corrupt, then the Mexican people will believe the military has more 
capabilities.  This concept of defining security as something other than by capabilities has 
also been discussed as “subjective security” by Wolfers (Wolfers, 1952). The gain in 
credibility will buy time to bring the capabilities of the Mexican military to a sufficient 
level to defend against the common threats of terrorism, drug cartels, illegal trafficking, 
and air and maritime sovereignty.  
Doctrine changes for the Mexican military should also incorporate counter 
insurgency operations to reflect the realities of the situation in Mexico vice the historic 
defense of Mexico against U.S. invasion.  Further changes to be instituted include: 
• A change in laws that would reflect the military or law enforcement (SSP) 
in command of operations against the Pack Virus  
• Revision of the operation plans to include a (JTF) joint task force 
structure.   
Though fighting the Pack Virus for almost three and a half years, the GOM still 
lacks unity of effort and unity of command as there is no one organization in charge of 
operations in Mexico.  The U.S. could offer experienced counter insurgency and strategic 
planners to contribute to the writing of a new Mexican doctrine that addresses these 
discrepancies.  
Organizational structure and the divide between SEMAR and SEDENA could be 
addressed in the following manner: 
1. Constructing a U.S. joint task force model, where each organization is 
represented within the structure of the task force would improve the unity 
of effort and command of operations against the Pack Virus.   
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2. Appointing the JTF commander in writing with the authority to conduct 
operations against the Pack Virus.  This would create unity of effort and 
enable other agencies and organization to support these efforts.   
3. Create additional JTFs along the already established military districts 
within Mexico.  If Mexico employs a JTF model, the intelligence function 
and process can be incorporated into the structure. Intelligence operations 
need to be expanded to include development of human resources.  While 
the capability is enhanced, the U.S. can contribute additional intelligence 
resources to Mexico as outlined by the 2007 Merida Initiative.  
2. Training, Leadership, and Education  
Efficient training, leadership, and education all require mentorship by a 
professional who is a subject matter expert in the particular area being studied. The 
military to military exchanges between the Mexican and U.S. military officers must 
continue.  While, these exchanges are ongoing and have occurred for some time, the 
number and frequency must be increased. The learning and sharing of ideas as equal 
partners is a very inexpensive way to build camaraderie and friendships.  Based on the 
Colombian experience, meetings and partnering efforts benefited both the Colombian and 
U.S. officers in development of future operations plans and the understanding of each 
perspective (Ramsey, 2009). These relationships then can be used to foster more 
communication between the two military institutions. Leveraging the experience gained 
from our current counter insurgency fights in Iraq and Afghanistan in the development of 
foreign militaries and police forces would allow Mexican commanders the opportunities 
to learn from our mistakes and triumphs on acting as a police force countering fourth 
generation warfare. The lessons learned from the Mexican military will benefit the U.S. 
officers when they return to combat overseas or if the drug violence were to escalate out 
of control on the northern side of the U.S. border. The increased interaction between the 
Mexican and U.S. military will help to create a more professional Mexican military.  
Maintaining these military to military contacts is important for future combined exercises 
and planning.  
Military training is the sharpening of the unit and the personnel. The foundation 
rests on the doctrine and organization of the military.  Changing the doctrine and 
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organization of the Mexican military to use counter insurgency techniques and 
procedures similar to those of the U.S. military is a requirement to improve the training 
and education of the Mexican military.  Proven combat techniques, tactics and procedures 
in fighting terrorists and insurgents in the Iraqi desert or the Pack Virus in gun battles in 
Juarez are all the similar and necessary to win a fourth generation gun battle.  However, 
winning the tactical gunfight is not as important as winning the population over to 
support operations against the Pack Virus.  Training to conduct COIN is more time 
consuming and can only be successful if there is decentralized execution of the TTPS on 
the battlefield.16   
Mentorship is a key component for all professional military education (PME).  
For example, as quoted by General John A. Lejune, in the U.S. Marine Corps 
Warfighting Publication 6-11, “The relation between officers and enlisted men should in 
no sense be that of superior and inferior, nor that of master and servant, but rather that of 
teacher and scholar.  In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father 
and son” (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], 2002).  Mentorship of all members of the 
Mexican military includes recognition of their abilities and constraints due to the doctrine 
and organization of the Mexican military.  Specifically, a mentorship program between 
the Mexican and U.S. military should be both sides acting as the teacher and the scholar 
learning from each other.  Even though the Mexican military does not emphasize joint 
operations, (Navy, Air Force, Army working together) training the Mexican military can 
be tailored to fit the student.  In addition, the interaction of the enlisted between the U.S. 
and Mexican military would provide the Mexican military with examples to emulate.  
The Mexican military must improve initial training for troops deployed to conduct 
operations in support of law enforcement.  Counter insurgency, police techniques, tactics, 




                                                 
16 For a list of TTPs comparison see Figure 7 in Chapter V. 
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3. Material Solutions  
Material solutions include the hardware and software of the command and control 
systems, radar platforms, and aircraft. These are excellent tools for assisting in the 
gaining and maintaining of situational awareness and gathering intelligence within 
Mexico. The United States is very good at producing technological solutions for military 
problems. Night vision goggles (NVGs) to counter human smuggling activities on the 
border are a prime example of the materiel solutions that the U.S. military is providing to 
the Mexican military at the tactical level. Advanced radar and sonar to track planes and 
boats in the Gulf of Mexico are hardware that can be used to gain situational awareness. 
These are examples of operational capabilities to be expanded and sustained under the 
Merida Initiative.  Additionally, the raw data created from the radar picture needs to be 
fed into a command and control center where the command, control, communication, 
computers and information (C4I) process can complete the intelligence picture for the 
Mexican military. The material solutions that USNORTHCOM is already providing to 
the Mexican military from the 2007 Merida Initiative include: ion scanners, aircraft, 
NVGs, small boats, and radars (Milardo, 2009).17  Increasing the capabilities for the 
Mexican military is only one part of the strategy.  A more capable Mexican military, with 
many new items but is still corrupt, will not help to support either the GOM strategy or 
the U.S. national strategy.  Correcting the problem of corruption is an ongoing and 
continuous problem for the GOM.  The use of technology, in the form of polygraphs, to 
decrease corruption is a simple material solution to the persistent problem which faces 
Mexico.  It should be noted that the polygraph is only as reliable as the operator.    
Material solutions and support from the U.S. in technology and specialized 
equipment should be sustained.  Mexico has the majority of military equipment required 
to sustain operations against the Pack Virus. More importantly, the equipment must be 
maintained and integrated into the entire military system.  Providing radars for air and 
maritime surveillance is useless if the personnel running the radars do not know how to  
 
                                                 
17 See Figure 5 for the list of military equipment funded by the 2007 Merida Initiative. 
 74
maintain the equipment and the equipment is not integrated and connected to the larger 
C4I system.  The material solution requires training of personnel to be effective and 
efficient.  
4. Personnel  
The corruption within the Mexican military is not a profound problem, but one 
that must be addressed in order to raise the credibility of the institution.  As the Zetas are 
famous for joining the military and learning military skills in order to then sell their 
capability to the drug cartels is a trend that must be countered (Grillo,2008)  The practice 
of recruiting the poor in Mexico will not change as the military is one avenue to create 
opportunities for the poorest to prosper.  Nevertheless, the Mexican military must start to 
recruit the increasing numbers of the growing middle class within Mexico. This will not 
lead to less corruption driven by money, as the cartels can pay incredible amounts of 
money to corrupt officials.  The inclusion of the middle class into the Mexican military 
would begin the transformation of the institution from the wealthy traditionalists as 
officers and the poor as enlisted.  USNORTHCOM can mentor the Mexican military and 
offer suggestions for recruiting more talented individuals. Once recruited the Mexican 
military must retain the best and brightest through education, pay, and providing facilities 
for their families.  
Increasing the quality of personnel of the Mexican military will contribute to 
decreasing the corruption within Mexico. The Mexican military that has the means to 
fight the drug cartels is less influenced by the cartels compared to Mexican law 
enforcement (Castaneda, 2010).  To increase its human capital, the Mexican military 
must be educated and trained to a higher standard. This training can occur at both U.S. 
military schools and the established Mexican military schools. Prior to attending a U.S. 
military school, the Mexican military personnel should take a polygraph test and be 
vetted by both the Mexican and U.S. governments. This would eliminate potential “bad 
apples” and raise the bar for the standards across the Mexican military and the Mexican 
federal government. It would be a first step to sharing of sensitive information with the 
Mexican military. Increasing the education and training of the Mexican military will 
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increase the capability and credibility of this institution. Having a strong, reliable and non 
corrupt military benefits Mexico by serving as a credible institution to emulate and 
employ. In addition, it benefits U.S. interests to have a competent ally on our southern 
border filling a current gap identified by the USNORTHCOM commander. 
5. Facilities  
The force protection of U.S. bases throughout the world is the highest standard for 
physical counter measures against terrorism (TRADOC, 1997). The Mexican military 
should improve the base structures in which the military is billeted. These secure 
locations then offer the Mexican military a place to keep families safe, fed, and housed. 
Once the Mexican military personnel have better base facilities they will be less 
susceptible to corruption from the drug cartels.  In addition, the institutions that develop 
the leadership within the Mexican military must be expanded. Academies for the officers, 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and boot camps should be modernized and through 
put increased. At these institutions, the Mexican military must develop lectures and 
teachings on ethics and loyalty to the Mexican constitution. These secure areas will 
provide the Mexican military with a place to train and live away from the outside 
influences of the drug cartels. Once the military bases are secure, the same principles of 
defense and counter measures can be applied to other critical infrastructure in Mexico 
such as the international electric power system and Gulf of Mexico oil platforms. 
E. CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE EIGHT FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
FUNDED THROUGH THE MERIDA INITIATIVE 
1. C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Information Management  
Increased command and control capability includes all parts of the C4I system. 
Having the ability to see across the Gulf of Mexico with a new radar system but not the 
ability to relay that information to a command post, which orders a new plane to intercept 
a suspected drug shipment, is not a failure of hardware or training but of a process. 
Increasing air and maritime awareness means tracking, listing, and controlling 
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information flow through and among Mexican military units with the responsibility for 
these missions. The increases in surveillance capabilities created by the Merida Initiative 
are useless without an increased capability in understanding C4I processes. Utilizing 
USNORTHCOM expertise to track and monitor all the air traffic in North America 
should be taught to the Mexican military.  
2. ISR: Intelligence Collection, Surveillance, Reconnaissance   
Increased numbers of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
collection platforms increases the surveillance capability of the Mexican military.  The 
material solutions have been discussed, yet the system to process the information gained 
from the sensor platforms must also be understood and mastered by Mexican military 
personnel.  Having the best radar platform, but not being able to maintain the system nor 
feed the information to a regional or national level headquarters, is a suboptimal 
application of a material solution. The importance is the ability to observe and report 
violations of Mexican maritime and air sovereignty. Providing real time situational 
awareness to the Mexican military increases the information used by the Mexican 
government to combat the common threat of drug smuggling. Increased surveillance, 
however, increases the information the military must process. Systems must be updated 
with hardware and software which allows this information to be processed through a C4I 
system producing better real time intelligence. These resources can be used for 
monitoring the border, maritime and air sovereignty or critical infrastructure.  
3. Intelligence  
Intelligence involves the processing of information to help make decisions. 
Intelligence is a broad area that includes: systems, human, signal, imagery, and electronic 
intelligence. All make up the separate parts of the intelligence system. Human 
intelligence must also be employed to fight human and drug smuggling operations. The 
integration of federal law enforcement information (DEA, FBI, ATF) already occurs 
within USNORTHCOM.  Similar integration within the Mexican military will not occur 
until the corruption problem is corrected.  Even so, vetted Mexican military must be 
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allowed to use U.S. intelligence to fight the Pack Virus.  Increasing the Mexican 
military’s ability to break cipher and encrypted messages or computers from drug cartels 
is not within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility; however, the U.S. can provide 
assistance in decoding the messages and computers.  This assistance can lead to new 
intelligence to be utilized against the Pack Virus.  Finding ways to utilize the vast 
intelligence resources of the U.S. in support of the Mexican military should continue.  
USNORTHCOM should be a bridge between the U.S. intelligence community and the 
Mexican military.  
4. Mexican Special Operations Forces (SOF)  
Mexican Special Operation Forces (SOF) must be increased to counter the 
internal threat from the Pack Virus. Special Forces conduct raids, undercover work, 
surveillance, tracking, and scouting missions for the military. These forces are in training 
longer and under more stressful conditions than conventional military troops. The 
increased professionalism of these forces leads to less corruption and increased 
operational capabilities among the Mexican military.  In the near term, these 
professionals are conducting raids on known drug cartel sites capturing people and 
equipment. In the future, after the Mexican law enforcement resumes responsibility for 
fighting the Pack Virus, special operations forces should be the bridge connecting the 
military to law enforcement.  Using this pathway, special operations forces and military 
personnel from the U.S. could train Mexican law enforcement in the near to midterm, 
until U.S. State Department teams are in place.  As described in Table 7, the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures needed in an asymmetric fight against the Pack Virus are best 
employed by the highly trained Special Operations Forces.  The use of special operations 
forces  increases as missions in the 4GW environment demand an increase in precision 
engagement, criminal investigations, and intelligence collection operations—which 
require more professionalism and specialization.   
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5. Institutional Development 
Institutional development is the increase of professionalism of the military 
through expansion of existing schools and courses, military to military liaison officers, 
observer, and distinguished visitor exchanges. In addition, the creation of Mexican non-
commissioned officer academies will create a more professional enlisted corps of military 
personnel.  Through boot camp to retirement, ethics, and loyalty to the Mexican 
constitution should be emphasized at all schools. The Mexican military should be a route 
out of poverty for anyone in Mexico as a non corrupt respected institution.  Building a 
more professional Mexican military regardless of capabilities will increase the credibility 
of the institution.  The Mexican military has historically been an institution of pride and 
power within Mexico.  Leveraging this tradition and increasing the professionalism of the 
military will create a stronger tool for the GOM to employ against the Pack Virus.  
6. Interdiction Operations 
Interdiction of suspected illegal traffickers is accomplished though integration of 
aircraft, speed boats, better checkpoints, and timely intelligence. Improved search 
techniques at random and known check points can lead to more information in respect to 
drug routes and human smuggling locations. Technologies (material solutions) are 
already being bought and employed by the Merida Initiative. The continuation of buying 
and maintaining the aircraft, speedboats, and sensors must be planned for by the Mexican 
military. The planning process and future funding for this existing equipment must begin 
immediately before the equipment becomes unserviceable.  In the fight against the Pack 
Virus, the interdiction of illegal trafficking routes creates intelligence for future 
operations and disrupts the funding and logistics of the Pack Virus.   
7. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is primarily a military function. 
The expansion of special operations forces will enable more assets to be employed in 
defending against the potential employment of these weapons. Terrorist groups using 
WMD or chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and high explosive yield (CBRNE) 
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devices are a common threat to both Mexico and the U.S. The failure to stop terrorists 
from using WMD will result in catastrophic economic, psychological, and physical 
damage. This damage will directly affect the national security of both nations no matter 
where the event occurs.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved the economic ties between 
America and Mexico were strained by shutting down the border. Andreas writes, “The 
resulting traffic jams and other border delays sent shock waves through the local 
economies on both sides of the border. Mexican trade to the United States contracted by 
15 percent in the weeks that followed” (2004). Counter proliferation operations, 
international agreements, and security assistance are common areas of cooperation 
focusing on WMD and terrorist groups, between Mexico and the United States.  
8. Consequence Management (CM) and Defense Support to Civilian 
Authorities (DSCA)  
Consequence management operations when conducted in a timely, orderly, and 
efficient manner builds the credibility of the military institution in the eyes of the people. 
Mexico’s laws dictate the use of the military during and after natural disasters, 
earthquakes, or hurricanes (Wager, 1994).  Consequence management involves providing 
an appropriate response to a disaster.  Providing capabilities to the local communities, 
which no other institution can provide due to timing or competing requirements, are basic 
humanitarian assistance tasks. Providing shelter, food and water; moving logistics and 
equipment; and operating in all areas are basic skills of any military organization.  
Building capabilities for consequence management that increase the basic skill level of 
the Mexican military should focus resources on these realistic and most likely operations.  
For example, both countries should start to conduct combined exercises using a scenario 
of a major hurricane hitting the international border of Texas and Mexico. Information 
sharing, planning, and the personnel exchanges for these exercises would enable regular 
interaction between the two militaries. Preparing to conduct consequence management 
operations will increase the professionalism of the Mexican military and create 
opportunities for interaction between the military and local communities. These 
relationships, in turn, can be leveraged to gain information on Pack Virus operations and 
community concerns.    
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The proper use of public affairs and information operations  during these training 
events could positively increase the perception of the Mexican military in areas such as 
Juarez.  Development of robust information operations and public affairs capabilities is a 
requirement for COIN and 4GW operations.  In addition, conducting combined 
operations in northern Mexico would generate additional information from local human 
sources and provide opportunities to the U.S. intelligence community to assist its 
Mexican counterpart target its region with electronic intelligence collection, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment. 
F. MEANS  
The lack of funding past 2011 is the immediate problem that the USNORTHCOM 
Mexico strategy faces. Congress must authorize new appropriations for funding the eight 
functional areas past 2011. There are currently 16 separate lines of funding that support 
the present day Merida Initiatives (Milardo, 2009).  The prioritization of funding must 
remain at the current level and not be reduced to the 2007 levels for this cooperation to 
continue towards success.  
Human capital as a resource must be employed through more mentorship 
programs and interaction between the leadership of both militaries. Trainers for the 
Mexican military must be identified, prepared and equipped for duties from the U.S. 
military. U.S. military trainers should be used to train the Mexican police until the DOS 
can arrange to have other teams take over and provide professional instruction. The 
Mexican military should be encouraged to expand the number of military members 
attending U.S. military schools at all levels. This training must occur immediately in 
order to employ the new materiel solutions (e.g., planes, helicopters, ion sensors). In 
addition to the police and specific skill sets, the U.S. military would benefit from training 
regular Mexican military personnel in preparation for its own operations in Afghanistan 
training Afghan armed forces, border guards, and law enforcement personnel. Training 
foreign militaries is a common mission for the U.S. military, but a specialty for Special 
Operations Forces. Gaining experience in a real world operation prior to combat 
operations will better prepare the entire U.S. military for its deployments.  
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Time is the most critical resource once the funding expires. Focusing on the near 
term requires that the capabilities and materiel solutions already funded must be delivered 
on time. Increasing funding along 16 separate lines of funding should be based on 
empirical research rather than the “wish list” mentality that occurred in the beginning of 
the Merida Initiative.18  Capability shortfalls must be prioritized in order to be identified, 
funded, and sourced. 
Leadership from senior officers in both militaries must continue to set the 
conditions for open exchanges and communication between the organizations. Military-
to-military exchanges, liaison positions, combined exercises, and education will only 
occur if the commander supports the program. Working together and providing the most 
talented officers to focus on the problems of funding and research is a leadership 
function. Recognizing which problems can be fixed through military solutions and which 
are best suited for other national level agencies must be identified by USNORTHCOM.   
Leveraging both the USNORTHCOM Interagency Directorate and the Standing 
Joint Force Headquarters (NC/SJFHQ) would enable numerous lines of communication 
and coordination to remain in place for planning, exercises, and support.  Prior to 
conducting combined operations with the Mexican military, these liaison officers and 
planners could conduct familiarization and orientation exchanges with the Mexican 
military.  Obviously, additional translators and language proficiency must be addressed 
for both militaries to operate efficiently together.  Yet, this frequent exchange of officers 
and planning, both the Mexican military and USNORTHCOM can facilitate the improved 
execution of real world operations. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Preparing for fourth generation warfare requires an expansion of intelligence 
collection, analysis, and processing of data with regard to these organizations.  Human 
intelligence takes years to develop, but must be employed in order to counter the growing 
                                                 
18 The “wish list” of items that was funded as military equipment for the initial purchase for the 
Mexican military was funded by utilizing sixteen separate lines of accounting, that were in some cases 
reimbursed once the Merida Initiative funding was approved (Milardo, 2009). 
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threat.  Though DoD controls almost 80 percent of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) 
assets, these assets are focused predominately on the threats in current theater of 
operations (Iraq and Afghanistan).  With limited DoD assets available in the 
USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, due to legal restrictions posed by intelligent 
oversight policies and employment in other theaters, the non-state entities in the U.S. 
must become a focus of DHS and DOJ intelligence gathering. 
There is little evidence that suggests a 4GW fight will be won by military means 
alone, as only seven percent of terrorist organizations are defeated through military 
means (Jones, 2010). A parallel is that successful counter gang strategies involve more 
than law enforcement (Brannan, 2006; Sullivan, 2008).  In addition, the 2007 Merida 
Initiative divides the responsibility of helping Mexico end drug violence by placing DOS 
as the lead federal agency and employing numerous agencies in addition to DoD. 
Yet, DoD should not be discarded as a vital player in the homeland security of the 
US, against this emerging threat.  Through USNORTHCOM, DoD should develop a 
strategy to increase the support to the Mexican military, which is currently fighting the 
Pack Virus. In fact, part of the solution to reducing the violence in Mexico and the U.S. is 
insuring that GOM defeats and disrupts the Pack Virus’s illegal trafficking operations 
along the U.S./Mexico border.  Lastly, the destruction of these groups will be through 
incarceration and destruction of leadership, intelligence sharing, and loss of profits from 
illegal trafficking operations.  This requires a coordinated support from law enforcement, 
DoD, DOS, and DOJ and the GOM counterparts. The grey area must be divided into 
operational lanes where each organization liaisons and contributes to solutions for each 
problem. 
Once the Pack Virus is contained and disrupted, the threat of terrorists using the 
illegal trafficking routes in order to infiltrate the U.S. will be decreased.  The “marriage 
of convenience” between terrorist groups and Pack Virus based on mutual interests and 
monetary gain may continue, but this interaction will be targeted by U.S. intelligence 
resources. Ultimately, Mexico and the U.S. will be more secure once these groups are 
marginalized as power brokers within Mexico.  Regardless of what definition is used to  
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define the Pack Virus or fourth generation warfare, the emerging threat to the future 
security of both nations is the non-state entities conducting illegal trafficking operations 
and open warfare in Mexico. 
 
 84
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goal of the recommendations is to strengthen the current Mexican national 
strategy and to prepare for a future fight with non-state entities on American soil by 
continuing to support the DOS efforts within the framework of the Merida Initiative.  In 
the previous chapters the problem of non-state entities conducting fourth generation 
warfare in Mexico was explained.  The Merida Initiative creates opportunities for 
USNORTHCOM to assist the Mexican military with indirect support.  The key take away 
from this thesis is that the problem is not isolated in Mexico, as these organizations have 
direct ties to cities within America (FBI, 2010).  Any solution to the “Mexico situation” 
must be a combined effort and supported by both the GOM and the U.S. (Winnefeld, 
2010). 
Diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law 
enforcement (DIME-FIL) means to achieve national objectives must be used together to 
defeat the threat of non-state entities operating in Mexico and the U.S.  Over reliance of 
the military to accomplish the mission will limit the effectiveness of the response 
(Department of the Army (b), 2006). Utilizing counter insurgency operations and law 
enforcement techniques enables the Mexican military to sharpen the focus of its 
operations among the populace; however, the military is still a blunt force instrument, 
where quick results may not eliminate the cause of the problem.  Social, economic, and 
information solutions may create environments more suitable to sustained rule of law and 
provide a catalyst for the people to openly seek to distance themselves from the non-state 
entities.  
Though far from a perfect solution, the GOM strategy to confront the Pack Virus 
by deploying the Mexican military as the lead agency creates opportunities for 
USNORTHCOM to partner with our strategic ally.  The support to the GOM must 
continue in order to confront the emerging threat to America.   The Mexican military is 
the least corrupt institution available to the GOM.  Solutions to confront the realities in 
Mexico are not limited to only the Mexican authorities.  The U.S. government can create 
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operational space by confronting the threat in the U.S. and by assisting the GOM through 
continued support of Merida.  The disruption of the Pack Virus throughout the U.S. will 
enable the GOM to confront the threat in Mexico with greater success. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation 1: Continue U.S. Indirect Military Support to 
Mexico 
President Calderon’s change in Mexican policy and the 2007 Merida Initiative 
have provided opportunities for DoD to strengthen ties with the Mexican military.  The 
U.S. must continue the indirect approach to countering the Pack Virus operating in 
Mexico.  Indirect military support to Mexico should be increased in the DOTMILPF 
areas described in Chapter VI.  Increase the number of U.S. personnel attending Mexican 
military schools and encourage the Mexican military to send more personnel to U.S. 
professional development courses.  This is an immediate and cost effective way to 
increase the capability of the Mexican military through mentorship, leadership in the 
middle, and the pacesetter approach (Goleman, 2000). 
In addition to utilizing the indirect support of military engagement with Mexico, 
the U.S. must increase the priority of Mexico in the Guidance for Employment of the 
Force (GEF) (Gates, 2009).19  The GEF must reflect the prioritization of Mexico as part 
of the U.S. national military strategy. A change to the GEF is needed to reflect the 
continuing support of the U.S. to Mexico.  
2. Recommendation 2: Leverage Consequence Management Combined 
Operations 
Consequence management is directed by law for both the Mexican and U.S. 
militaries.20 The intent of the law is clear that the military can respond to disasters.  
                                                 
19 The Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) is a classified document.  It establishes the 
priorities for the services and assigns responsibilities for the combatant commanders.  
20 The Mexican Defense plan of DN-III-E establishes military procedures during a natural disaster.  It 
can be found at http://www.sedena.gob.mx. 
 87
Planning to discuss the issues of search and rescue (SAR) operations, mass migrations, 
mutual assistance, and air and maritime control of the operational area must occur in the 
near future.  Providing a template of organization of a combined headquarters in the case 
of a disaster along the border is one mission of the USNORTHCOM Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters (NC/SJFHQ).  Leveraging these officers and the consequence management 
professionals of USNORTHCOM to plan for resource shortfalls is necessary to produce 
better operational plans for both the U.S. and Mexico. The Mexican military and 
USNORTHCOM must develop common terminology and habitual working relationships 
prior to a disaster occurring.  As the two militaries become more familiar with each 
other’s operations, capabilities, and terminology, the working relationship between the 
U.S. and Mexico will become less rigid and, hopefully, less formal.  A relationship 
similar to the U.S. Marines and the British Royal Marines, where the organizations 
effectively communicate ideas, plan, and train together, would enable the two 
organizations to operate successfully together during war 21 (Gordon & Trainor, 2006).  
Consequence management offers an immediate template to work through common issues 
which can be used for subsequent discussions about mutual support against the Pack 
Virus.  In addition, as a planning event against national disasters and catastrophic events, 
politicians, the public, and critics are less likely to complain of increasing readiness that 
directly contributes to increased preparedness and more rapid and effective response 
among ourselves and neighbors. 
More importantly, when combating 4GW, the strategic message to the populace 
must be reinforced that the Mexican and U.S. militaries are working together.  Meeting 
and discussions of consequence management are not only needed to improve the 
efficiency of both militaries during a disaster, but create a unified message that the two 
militaries are capable of solving mutual problems together.  The two militaries working 
together and sharing information enable a stronger in depth defense of North America 
from common threats. 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed description, read Gordon and Trainor’s Cobra II, about how the U.S. Marines of 
the 15th MEU were working for a British General who worked for a combined joint forces land component 
commander, who is a U.S. Army General. 
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3. Recommendation 3: U.S. Congress Fund the Merida Initiative Past 
2011 
Through the 2007 Merida Initiative, the U.S. and Mexico have used diplomacy 
and finances to support the Mexican change in policy.  Merida has created the support 
template to Mexico and contributes to the military, financial, intelligence, and law 
enforcement of DIME-FIL.  Arguably the economic portion of aiding Mexico with 1.4 
billion dollars in funding is an important part of the program. Yet, the original agreement 
was only funded until 2011 by the U.S. Congress (Milardo, 2009).  The Merida Initiative 
must continue and be fully funded past the original 2011 deadline.  The Initiative is more 
than just a military solution.  It encompasses most elements of DIME-FIL (diplomacy, 
information, military, economic, finances, intelligence, and law enforcement).  The 
emphasis on supporting all of the tenets of national power must be maintained and 
continued for the GOM to be successful in defeating the Pack Virus.   
USNORTHCOM has identified eight functional areas that have already received 
support and funding due to Merida.  These functional areas must be funded with a more 
streamlined approach of appropriations instead of 16 separate lines of accounting 
(Milardo, 2009).  The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy requires additional funding to 
achieve the increases in the Mexican military professionalism required to defeat the drug 
trafficking organizations, the paramilitaries, and the violent gangs within Mexico and the 
U.S.  The funding requires congressional support through appropriations of specific funds 
by new legislation and appropriations or through supplemental funding.22 
Fixing the immediate gaps in capabilities already established by the Merida 
Initiative is a continuous process of identifying, prioritizing, and sourcing. The U.S. 
military industrial complex is superior at providing materiel solutions to the capability 
problems of the Mexican military. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a 
study to “assess the effect that Border Patrol activity has on the number of illegal entry 
                                                 
22 The fiscal year 2011 supplemental appropriations act signed by President Obama on June 25, 2010 
authorized an additional 420 million dollars for the Merida Initiative (Committee on Appropriations, 2010).  
As of August 2, 2010, no other information was available on the distribution of funds as to whether this 
was additional funding or just the release of funds from the original 1.4 billion dollars pledged (U.S 
Embassy Mexico, 2010). 
 89
attempts” and the illegal immigration rates from Mexico along the southwest border 
(Center for Naval Analysis, 2008). As the CNA report states, sourcing capabilities that 
are not needed or not integrated are not helpful.  Research on specific shortfalls must be 
undertaken in order to prioritize which shortfall will be sourced.  A dedicated team of 
officers or finance professionals should be formed to continue preparing for budget items, 
until the U.S. Congress appropriates funding to directly support Mexico.  
4 Recommendation 4:  Military to Military Exchanges 
Increasing the number of military to military exchanges and conferences is an 
immediate and cost effective approach to supporting Mexico. These exchanges provide 
venues in which to communicate and plan for consequence management operations.  In 
addition, these venues provide opportunities for U.S. intelligence agencies to vet the 
Mexican officers who attend the conferences against drug cartel organizational charts.  
An immediate conference of senior leaders from both countries must occur to 
identify the problems of the Merida Initiative.  The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy 
must have Mexican input and reflect plausible outcomes.  This is similar to the 
observations of Ramsey when studying after actions of Plan Colombia stated that 
planning and interaction with the U.S. military raised the level of professionalism and 
provided improved solutions to the problems of DTOs (Ramsey, 2009). Without 
collaboration from the Mexican military the USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will fail.  
5. Recommendation 5:  Increase Intelligence Collection Operations on 
Non-State Entities 
Intelligence must drive proactive operations instead of reactive investigations of 
crimes committed by the Pack Virus.  This is similar to the intelligence led policing (ILP) 
report of New Jersey, where law enforcement is “shifting from emphasizing post-event 
evidence collection to constantly gathering all relevant data” (Fuentes, 2006).  DoD 
assets must be used in collection operations against the Pack Virus as DoD controls 75 to 
80 percent of the Intelligence Community’s (IC) assets (Lowenthal, 2009).   
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In addition, similar violent groups have been successfully targeted by utilizing a 
task force model.  In 2005, the National Major Gang Task Force utilized the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to prosecute members of MS-13.  The 
collaborative efforts of the federal intelligence community combined with local law 
enforcement activities would have a greater effect on diminishing the capabilities of these 
organizations.  According to the National Major Gang Task Force, “The integration and 
partnerships between corrections, law enforcement, military and education has resulted in 
obtaining successful state criminal indictments and Federal Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) prosecutions with multiple defendants” (2005).  Creating 
a similar joint task force may produce similar results against the Pack Virus.  
One approach is to create a joint task force (JTF) targeting non-state entities 
similar to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) that pursue terrorist organizations and 
violent criminal gangs.  The task force must include interagency partners from the GOM 
and the U.S.  The collection of information against non-state groups must include 
national intelligence assets, federal law enforcement liaison with other nations, and 
partners within the criminal justice system.  Prison officials, parole officers, and social 
workers who have contact with the people of these groups must be cultivated as sources 
of information.  Collection from human sources close to or within these groups takes 
considerable time to organize (Department of the Army (a), 2006; Perkins, 1998).  
Therefore, the proposed JTF must start now to create human intelligence about these 
groups in order to assist Mexico and prepare for possible increased violence in the U.S. 
from non-state entities.  Developing the human element of local law enforcement 
informants and tip lines from the public will lead to more arrests in order to disrupt 
operations.  Liaison officers from Mexico must be vetted and included into the JTF.23  
Since the non-state groups are international in nature, limiting the potential collection of 
information to only U.S. law enforcement assets plays to the advantage of non-state 
entities by enabling them to remain clandestine and use jurisdiction to elude the police.   
                                                 
23 If a JTF is established with foreign military members it is technically called a CJTF for Combined 
Joint Task Force, yet for the purposes of this thesis the term JTF will suffice. 
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Cooperation among federal agencies and departments must occur and all federal 
agencies should contribute to the JTF.  The Department of Treasury must be involved in 
tracking the finances of these groups.  The Department of State must be involved in 
sharing information and requesting information from other nations (particularly 
Colombia, El Salvador, Canada, and Mexico) to track the movements and leadership of 
these groups.  Finally, the Department of Homeland Security must lead the efforts to 
prioritize the non-state groups as an emerging threat to America and lead the JTF 
intelligence requirements as DHS is the organization with responsibility for border 
security.  Channell explained the emphasis on prioritization of the intelligence process 
when we writes, “Senior officials [of DHS] should first identify the new agency's 
intelligence requirements or Essential Elements of Information (EEI)…while ensuring 
that intelligence assessments or even raw information is disseminated quickly to law 
enforcement and security personnel” (2002).  Energizing and informing the intelligence 
community’s policy makers that DHS sees these non-state groups as a priority creates the 
conditions to improve the process of intelligence gathering on the Pack Virus.  In 
addition, DHS will provide the feedback from the consumer of intelligence to focus 
national assets on this tactically challenging problem and provide strategically important 
support to allies against non-state organizations.   
6. Recommendation 6:  Continue the Extraditions of DTO Leaders to 
the U.S. 
In Mexico, the criminal justice system is corrupt and broken (Kearney, 2009).  In 
the future, the entire Mexican criminal justice system must be used to support the fight 
against the non-state entities.  Prisons, judges, courts, and prosecutors must be focused on 
this problem.  In Mexico, numerous people have bribed or shot their way out of prisons, 
which are controlled by the inmates through corruption of officials (El Universal, 2010; 
Inside Prison.Com).  This Pack Virus tactic of breaking out of prison has not yet occurred 
in the U.S.  However, in both the U.S. and Mexico, non-state entities continue to operate 
from prison. “According to the LA Times, gang members pay guards to smuggle in cell 
phones, which members use to consult and communicate with other members in 
Guatemala, Honduras and the US” (Corsi, 2007; Inside Prison.Com).  Currently, Mexico 
 92
uses a secret court system and unidentified judges in order to help fight the corruption 
(Kearney, 2009).  Until Mexico creates a less corrupt criminal justice system, which 
enables the non-state entities to operate within the system, high profile leaders should 
continue to be extradited to the U.S. in order to stand trial.    
7. Recommendation 7: Revise the Roles of the Military in U.S. 
Homeland Defense  
The operational use of the U.S. military must be revised in order to support the 
other components of national power.  The strategic concept that a strong military will 
deter an enemy must be updated to take into consideration the globalization and 
systematic violence a non-state entity can bring to bear within a state.  Globalization has 
created interconnectedness and complexity that calls for reevaluation of the use of the 
military as deterrence (Moghaddam, 2008).  Strategically, having the best military is not 
a deterrent for non-state entities as the 9/11 attacks and Al Qaeda have proven.    
Non-state entities are using fourth generation warfare (4GW) to fight for control 
of areas in Mexico.  Placing the responsibility of targeting and collecting information 
regularly against  these non-state entities on the U.S. military would be a very proactive 
step in policy to prepare for 4GW occurring on American soil.  Non-state entities in 
Mexico and the U.S. conduct intelligence operations, intimidation campaigns, 
information operations, transportation, and networking to conduct illegal trafficking 
operations.  In addition, these groups are well equipped and financed (Grayson, 2010; 
Grillo, 2008).  Employing the military solely in the role of the police to provide strategic 
solutions will handicap the government’s response similar to the results of the last few 
years in Mexico.  The U.S. military must prepare for the next fight before it occurs on 
U.S. soil by better integration and collaboration with U.S. law enforcement prior to the 
escalation of violence in America.      
Proactively and properly preparing for war is to prepare the battlefield prior to 
fighting (Department of the Army, 1994; Tzu, 2009).  Currently the use of liaison officers 
from the DEA, FBI, DHS, ATF and other law enforcement agencies at USNORTHCOM 
and JTF North, enables the military to have a basic understanding of the growing threat.  
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The gathering of intelligence, targeting (kinetic and non kinetic) and interdiction of non-
state entities no matter their location or intent would increase the understanding and 
knowledge of the enemy.  The revised military approach would be a strategic shift in 
targeting non-state entities for engagement by the U.S. military.    
A change to U.S. law, specifically the use of Active Duty Title 10 forces in the 
indirect support but not “pursuit and apprehension” of these non-state groups operating in 
the U.S., is not needed.  The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) limits the U.S. 
military in its ability to conduct law enforcement operations in the U.S., but more 
specifically it limits the arrest of American citizens by the military.  Some of the people 
within the Pack Virus are U.S. citizens.  The power to use the military against non-state 
entities engaged in these criminal activities is already available.  As Lieutenant Colonel 
Sanchez addressed in his comments during the planning conference in February 2010, 
“The U.S. military can target these groups outside the U.S. according to 10USC 376-385, 
CJCSI 3121.01B and fiscal year 1991 NDAA (National Defense Appropriations Act) sect 
1004B as amended” (2010).  DoD would not be the lead, but would support law 
enforcement efforts throughout the U.S.   
Legislation allowing intelligence gathering and surveillance of non-state entities 
involved in terrorism or narcotics trafficking in America by the U.S. military is already in 
place (Sanchez, 2010).  As highlighted by the GOM, the use of the military to provide a 
police force to counter the non-state entities in Mexico is one tool a nation state can 
employ to defeat non-state entities.  Historically, the U.S. has used the military in areas 
where corruption or ideology did not allow law enforcement to be trusted to fulfill the 
mission.  The intervention by the U.S. military during the late 1950s in response to efforts 
to secure civil rights is one historical example of intervention by the U.S. military in the 
U.S (U.S. Army, 2010).  The current military deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have 
created a talented pool of counter insurgency operators.  This corps of professionals can 
write new doctrine and continue to train for these types of operations in support of U.S. 
law enforcement, but only if directed by the DoD and USNORTHCOM. 
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8. Recommendation 8:  Improving the Mexican Military 
The following recommendations are to improve the Mexican military in their 
primary mission as law enforcement in order to support the GOM strategy for dealing 
with the Pack Virus.  However, these recommendations are made not from personal 
experience or observations but from open source reporting of the operations in Mexico.  
Recommendations include: 
1. The Mexican military should also incorporate counter insurgency (COIN) 
operations into the doctrine.  Utilizing the best practices from both Plan 
Colombia and the current U.S. wars provide a foundation for a change of 
military doctrine by the Mexican military.  This change would reflect 
more counter insurgency operations and would contribute to the capability 
of the military in this current fight against the Pack Virus. 
2. The divide between SEMAR and SEDENA could be addressed by 
adopting the U.S. joint task force (JTF) system, where each organization is 
represented within the structure of the task force.  However, creating a like 
image of the U.S. military in Mexico will not be supported nor is endorsed 
due to historical and cultural legacy of Mexico.  Fortunately, the JTF 
model can be used to integrate both organizations without disrupting the 
Mexican constitution and be immediately employed as an operational 
concept and model.   
3. The Mexican military must improve initial training for troops deployed to 
conduct operations in support of law enforcement.  Counterinsurgency 
operations and police techniques, tactics, and procedures must be taught, 
maintained, and sustained throughout this contingency operation.  The 
U.S. could offer experienced COIN planners to sustain Mexican doctrine 
development.  In addition, the U.S. could continue to provide mobile 
training teams (MTTs) to teach small units of the Mexican military. 
4. Leadership and career courses for the Mexican military must be created.  
Until these staff academies are operational, the U.S. could increase the 
input of Mexican military to these career courses.  In addition, Mexican 
liaison officers could be vetted through intelligence and military 
processes.  Once vetted, these officers would help to bring additional 
credibility to the Mexican military.  The use of American courses is a 
temporary solution to fill the void until the Mexican military can perform 
this function.   
5. The Mexican military should improve the base structures in which the 
military is billeted in order to create safe havens which cannot be 
penetrated by the Pack Virus. 
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B. CONCLUSION  
The ultimate objective of the U.S. national strategy is to strengthen the 
government of Mexico through indirect support to the Mexican military and increase the 
efficiency of the Mexican justice system.  Assisting the GOM to defeat the Pack Virus 
will help to stop the illegal trafficking prior to entering Mexico from Central and South 
America and will relieve pressure on the Department of Homeland Security to control the 
flow of drugs across the 2000-mile southern American border and the Gulf Coast region.  
As stated by the commander NORAD and USNORTHCOM, Admiral Winnefeld, “While 
not a counterinsurgency, the Mexico situation has many of the same characteristics” 
(Winnefeld, 2010). 
The USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will reinforce the principles of the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS) of America which emphasizes the importance of 
defending America against threats before they occur in the United States by having an 
“active layered defense” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008).  The strengthening of our 
southern ally supports this national strategy.  In addition to supporting the NDS, the 
USNORTHCOM Mexico strategy will benefit Mexico in the transformation of its 
military into a more professional and specialized counterinsurgency force.  Fortunately, 
this is one of the strongest and least corrupt institutions within Mexico.  More 
importantly, a stronger Mexican military enables the U.S. to partner with Mexico during 
response efforts to natural or man-made disasters along the international border.  
Leveraging the expertise and resources of the U.S. military to partner with the Mexican 
military in order to help educate the Mexican military in counter insurgency operations is 
within the construct of the Merida Initiative and supports the growth and transformation 
of the Mexican military to create a layered defense. 
Obviously, the strengthening of the Mexican military benefits more than just the 
DoD mission.  There are three main beneficiaries of the USNORTHCOM Mexico 
strategy.  The Mexican people, DHS, and the U.S. economy will benefit from a stronger 
and more capable Mexican military which provides a foundation for the GOM to 
reestablish law and order to the chaos of the “Mexican situation.”  A strong Mexican 
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military solidifies the authority of the Mexican government, creates an institution to 
provide a foundation for leveraging support against the Pack Virus, and contributes to 
more stability for economic development in both Mexico and the U.S.  
The USNORTHCOM goal to equip and train the Mexican military to a level that 
creates a more professional institution is obtainable through continued indirect support to 
the Mexican military.  This enables USNORTHCOM to partner with the Mexican 
military for combined exercises and operations involving counter narcotic and 
consequence management operations.  President Calderon’s employment of the Mexican 
military against the Pack Virus buys time for the Mexican government to create less 
corrupt Mexican law enforcement units.  A less corrupt and more prosperous Mexico is a 
benefit to the U.S. and to the people of Mexico.  
As addressed by the Merida Initiative, training of Mexican law enforcement must 
occur in order to replace the military already deployed to fight the Pack Virus.  A more 
efficient and less corrupt Mexican judicial system will allow the Mexican military to 
focus on theater level common threats and strengthen all of North America against the 
Pack Virus, terrorist groups, and natural and man-made disasters.  Eliminating the 
corruption in one historic Mexican institution creates operational space for the Mexican 
government to generate economic growth, increase stability, and reduce violence.  The 
increased situational awareness of the Mexican national air and maritime sovereignty by 
GOM produces a theater partner capable of detecting and responding to threats prior to 
detection and engagement by the U.S. The increases in capability of the GOM produce 
opportunities that can allow for greater trade, increased tourism and better economic 
opportunities for the people of Mexico and the United States.  
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